

1957

PROCEEDINGS


FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION

of

THE CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

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PREFACE

We herein present the proceedings of the fourth annual convention of the Christian Association for Psychological Studies. The first convention was a conference of men and women professionally engaged in psychology and psychiatry and those whose areas of service closely relate to these fields. At the second conference in 1955 a tentative constitution was adopted on the basis of which a more formal organization could be projected. It was at the 1956 conference herein reported that a permanent organization was affected under the title Christian Association for Psychological Studies.

If the first three conferences may be designated as largely exploratory, the fourth may be said to have come to grips with basic concepts in psychology and psychiatry in a Christian framework of thought. Psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric-social workers, pastors, teachers, and counselors in general who are Christians are asking the question, What difference does it make in our practice of human relations that we accept the Christian faith and that we want to be Christians in our work with people? This Association stands committed to the endeavor of exploring the relevance of the Christian faith in all these fields. The constitution adopted at this convention expresses the purpose of the Association as follows:

The Association aims to advance the Christian understanding of psychology and related areas in conformity with the above basis - Article II which states: The Association shall be based on the Bible as interpreted in the historic Reformed Creeds.... . In order to realize this aim the Association shall:

1. Develop this understanding through study and research.
2. Assemble annually in convention for presentation of papers, discussion, and carrying on the official business of the association.
3. Publish proceedings of the conventions and such additional studies as approved from time to time by the Board of Directors.
4. Serve the needs and interests of professional groups concerned with inter-personal relations.

The Association envisages a large and extensive program of research and publications in the years to come. May the Lord bless our humble efforts to bring these areas of endeavor into captivity to the Lordship of Christ.

Cornelius Jaarsma,
Executive Secretary.

September, 1957.

Correlation coefficient
-0.76

TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY

Dr. John T. Daling

- Introduction -

The topic was assigned to the writer. It is a significant one, and expressed very felicitously. Its formulation conveys the wholesome thrust that finality is not to be expected; rather, it suggests the exploring of a large area with a definite objective. The objective is not that of a concept of Christian personality, but of a Christian concept of personality. The distinction is much more than verbal; it involves different backlogs of meaning and approach. The Committee is to be complimented for the formulation of the topic, whatever be the fortune of its treatment.

The term personality, like many others in significant discussions, is veritably a tricky one. The approaches to it are not limited to the psychological; there are others, such as the theological, sociological, ethical, and so on. Even within the psychological area the approaches may be various: some may focus on the historical origin and usages of the term; others interested in measurement and testing are likely to look upon personality as a complex of abilities and characteristics; those doing research in group behavior may consider the term as indicating the role one plays in life; while those involved in the diagnostic or therapeutic approach are likely to look on personality as the unique totality of an individual's dynamic factors; and still other approaches are possible. In 1938 Gordon W. Allport located some forty-eight differing definitions for the term personality;⁽¹⁾ at the rate books and articles on this topic have appeared since then one can safely conjecture that there are now still more definitions.⁽²⁾ Hence to add another is not likely to cause an explosive revolution in the psychological world.

One main reason for the great variety of definitions of personality, obviously, is that of conscious or unconscious root differences in generic religio-philosophical commitments to the totality of reality. But another big reason is that the very subject matter itself is so indefinitely complex or else so bafflingly simple that it is difficult to pinpoint it. Still a third reason is that each definer is likely to highlight only certain sub-areas of personality, perhaps because of his vested interest, or because of his ignorance of other sub-areas, or simply because the area itself is too vast to encompass in a single view. The present treatment will itself most likely be illustrative of these reasons.

1. Cf. Harrimann, P.L.; AN OUTLINE OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY, 1956; p.194.
2. A very recent book discusses under thirteen main headings or categories no less than thirty-two different views on personality which are current in this country: Hall, C.S. and Linsey, G.; THEORIES OF PERSONALITY, February, 1957.

Other preliminary remarks could be made to set the stage properly for the present attempt to define personality. Admittedly, too many of them become an impediment to the main project. But these ought to be said: The definition ought to attempt to address itself to personality in its totality; to limit the definition to the so-called higher or highest aspects of personality, to what personality is "in essence", may be as inadequate to personality itself as it is to limit the definition to so-called lower aspects, to what personality is "in accidens". It may well be that "accidens" and "essence" existentially intertwine inseparably in personality. Hence, one must in this attempt also guard against the danger of assuming that whatever is distinguishable in thought is therefore also necessarily distinct or separate in fact.

GENERAL PROCEDURE

The present approach intends to be what may be called existential, not in the sense of reflecting a school of thought by this name but in the sense of considering man as he actually is in his daily joys and struggles. Furthermore, the approach is not developmental but in some sense reflective, i.e. it does not begin with the baby and trace how it becomes a person or a personality, but it begins with the adult. The difference is significant in other respects than mere methodological: one has a better chance of noting what a human being really is by taking a close look at an adult than at a baby, the former allows "ways of looking" not applicable to the latter.

How to get started on this matter of personality is a vexing problem even after one has selected the general approach. There seems to be no simple nor single starting point where each must begin.⁽¹⁾ Tho one must start somewhere, the nature of the subject seems to demand that one start everywhere at the same time and by sheer inner connections flit from almost any arbitrarily selected somewhere to almost any actual anywhere. This is no intellectually generated word play, it is but a fragmentary description of the existential situation. Small wonder, therefore, that the writings on personality are so varied in their approach, treatment, and conclusion. Each may contain truth, some more than others, some more significant than others, none of them the whole truth about the total person and his personality. The most that can be hoped for in even the present treatment is that some of the more relevant and significant aspects are brought into a kind of focus which truly reflects the nature of the actual situation.

In the face of these initial difficulties I propose to start out with the simple question: "What am I" (or you)? This may not be the conventional approach, but it is intended by this means to get at the totality of the person and thus avoid the likelihood of restricting the investigation at the outset to only certain of its relevant dimensions; furthermore, "person" and "personality" as concepts are general, but their referents are concrete, living existential instances.

1. Altho where and how one does begin may itself be significant not merely as a matter of methodology but more importantly with respect to the areas covered and conclusions reached.

Since "What am I"(or you) is itself such a large subject, some delimitation must be made to keep the treatment within the confines of a paper. Thus it happens that this paper focuses attention almost exclusively on the structural aspect of the person, on his compositional make-up. The "dynamic" aspect, the actional, the "how and the why", has been omitted almost entirely. This type of delimitation may thus rightly be viewed as an abstraction, as a "lifting out of context", or as treating only one facet of a multi-faceted reality. With respect to the main title, therefore, this paper can at best be considered only a fragment. Added to this, even the structural "facet" of the person is so involved and ramified that the present treatment can in turn only be considered as a fragment of it.

A close look at "What am I"(or you) soon reveals a paradox of tantalizing complexity on the one hand and baffling simplicity on the other. The human being seems to be an organic unity⁽²⁾ of many intellectually distinguishable components which functionally or existentially interact dynamically. Resident in this "unity" is also a "uniqueness" which is not reducible to the coalescence of these distinguishable interrelating factors, though it is influenced by this coalescence and in turn can in some sense influence it. Some of these distinguishable factors are functionally operative in and cognitively accessible at the level of consciousness, others are functionally operative in the mental area of the person yet not cognitively accessible to him by ordinary means, and possibly some which are as yet inaccessible by any known means.

It is not unlikely that in this paper some of the relevant factors will be overlooked, but the main purpose will be to sketch the main lines of those that are distinguishable in the compositional make-up of the human being. One of the underlying assumptions in this procedure is that tho the "person" is intellectually distinguishable in the compositional make-up, the "person" is functionally interfused with and inter-influential in it. Thus the main thrust will be largely that of analyzing or making more explicit what some may consider rather commonplace, and others not.

STRUCTURAL COMPOSITION OF THE PERSON.

If one takes an a-temporal or static cross-sectional view of the human being's structure, one can distinguish a variety of components even tho they may be functionally intertwined and interactive.

- 1) The physical. Man is a spatic-temporal mass. The contour of his particular mass and the manner of its physical workings as well as the temporal moment of his own life's history and the moment of the history he lives in - all these do affect him not merely as a physical being but as a person: sufficient physical force kills him, and how he looks or what he can or cannot do physically influence him as a person, even during birth a physical injury may cause permanent damage to the person because of the consequent effects muscularly or mentally (spastics or retarded).

(2) As meant here "organic unity" is not necessarily a unity of only organic things, altho those of naturalistic bent gratuitously assume it to be so.

- 2) The chemical. How the various material substances of his physical mass interact among themselves and/or with those of other material substances is another factor that influences him as a person - a drop of pure nicotine in his blood stream may kill him, a certain amount of alcohol in his blood stream may make him a doddering mass and a blustery fool, some specks of dust on his skin may not only irritate him on the "outside" but also on the "inside", and it still isn't fully known what close correlation or even causation there may be between body chemistry and at least certain kinds of serious mental disorders (some evidence indicates e.g. that epilepsy may be more a matter of brain chemistry than of structural disorder).
- 3) The physiological. How the chemically interacting material substances variously differentiate into distinguishable organs inter-relatedly functioning in the assimilation and dissimulation of energy for the maintenance of life, growth, and for reproduction, is another factor that affects man not only as a physical living being but also as a person - insufficient oxygen pre-natally may make the person mentally retarded, a significant temporary lack of oxygen any time post-natally may permanently stunt at least the conscious level of the person, a malfunctioning of only a pea-sized organ (e.g. pituitary or thyroid) may not only affect the bodily aspects but even cause serious upheavals in the psychical aspects of the person, on the other hand the person may so affect himself psychically that he brings about malfunctioning or even disfunctioning in areas of his bodily dimension (e.g. psycho-somatic disorders).
- 4) The neurological. Not merely the general characteristic of sensitivity or responsiveness to stimuli, but the character of the specific person's neural makeup and the general condition or degree of the specific individual's neural sensitivity are factors which influence him as a person, factors that go into making him be the kind of person he is - the deaf person is likely to become a suspicious one because of his deafness, the sthenic or asthenic quality of at least some people seems to have a constitutional base.
- 5) The unconscious. As used here it refers to that harboring area of one's mental dimension where "traces" or remnants of one's past are somehow retained after their original experience is over; it may also include other mental content not precipitated from any specific experience but existent as non-conscious urgings or psychical drifts (perhaps inherited from one's parentage or non-cogitatively generated in the inner workings of one's own being). Not only the specific range and content of a given person's "unconscious" but also the degree and direction of its activity are factors that influence the individual as a person. In fact, some psychologists claim that most of the human being's mentality is submerged and concealed yet profoundly active in the "higher" areas of mentality - seeming boldness may be but concealment of real timidity, repressed hostilities may mask under good deeds, strongly operative irrational fears may have a specific cause long forgotten.
- 6) The conscious. This is taken to refer to that area of one's mental dimension of which one is or can become aware thru the exercise of his power or sensory perception, memory, imagination, or introspection (or perhaps thru the exercise of some sort of "psychic" capacity

such as extra-sensory perception, pre-cognition, telepathy, or other "mystic" means).

7) The self-conscious. This refers to another distinguishable area of one's mental dimension which involves the awareness that one is aware and all the self-consciously or "awaredly" directed awarenesses and conclusions that flow from this thru directed reasoning, understanding, reflecting, and perhaps intuition as some sort of supra-intellectuated direct insight.

Obviously, what the individual becomes aware of and what sort of awarenesses he has of himself, in other words, the extent and the depth of the exercise and consequent content of the conscious and self-conscious factors affect him as a person. In fact, many non-psychologists want to make these two not merely factors which affect the person but exclusively constitutive of the person; some even seem to make the self-conscious factor the sole characteristic of a person's unique being. In passing it may be interjected that those who hold such a view may want to mean that the capacity of self-consciousness uniquely distinguishes human beings from non-human (although it may be questioned whether even this is the sole characteristic), but this then is quite a different matter. The question at hand is: "What am I?"

If the above delineation of structural components approximates the actual situation, the answer at this point in simplified form is that I am "lots of things all in one." There is much accuracy in this phraseology. The treatment given has missed its purpose if the serial enumeration is interpreted as disjuncted parts or only ancillary baggage. The impression that wanted to be communicated is that these are all but distinguishable aspects interacting with and interinfluencing each other in such manners that the compositional diversity functions as an organismic unity comprising my personality from its static structural standpoint.

DYNAMIC FACTORS MOLDING THE PERSON.

However, "What am I?" takes on intensely significant added features of complexity when one bears in mind that a person does not live in a vacuum nor in an endlessly static moment. In short, heredity and environment are also relevant influencing factors in the makeup of personality.

It is well known that hereditarily certain features in various combinations from one's parentage get passed on to influence both bodily and mental aspects of the person. Not only certain external physical characteristics but also internal structure or functioning as well as the possibility of predisposition to specific body diseases or disorders may be inherited. Likewise, mental characteristics such as degree of intellectual capacity and possibly certain temperament traits besides

the possibility of predisposition to mental disease, (4) and still other psychical influences from the past. (5) The point that wants to be made is not to give a detailed account of heredity but to indicate and underscore that the person's "trans-personal past" (the specific hereditary influences that are in his make-up) in varying degrees actively mediates the life history of the person.

Dynamically conjoined with this "transpersonal past" is the general tenor of the epoch or "zeitgeist" and the specific environments in which the person finds himself. (6)

As here used "environment" should be given its widest possible reference. It makes some difference where the person lives as far as sheer physical environment is concerned, as well as what parts of that physical environment he uses in and for his living (e.g. his work and food). It will make more difference what his social environment is, not only with respect to his class and group memberships but also with respect to the kind of individuals in these. Added to these is his spiritual environment in the sense of his exposure to the realms of the good, the true, the beautiful, and the holy. Granted that the person himself in some measure molds his "inner environment" with regard to spiritual or non-material matters, it is nevertheless also a fact that

(4) Prof. Kallmann of New York State Psychiatric Institute made a study of some 7,000 twins. On this basis he claims that severe mental illness is far more a hereditary matter than environmental. He admits that some mental illness may stem from environmental pressures such as unhappy childhood, early sex experience, over-strict toilet training, etc. but, says he, if these were the only reasons why aren't others harmed who live in the same or even worse circumstances. In short, we are products not only of environment, but of inborn strengths and weaknesses along mental lines as well as bodily ones. With respect to the latter Kallmann claims that in his study only 26% of fraternal twins both had T.B. whereas 87% of identical twins both had it, and that there was similar positive evidence of heredity in diabetes, epilepsy, polio, blindness, and deafness.

(5) E.g. the root ethical tendency in our nature; in other words, the Christian belief that propensity toward evil is inherited. Besides this, there are the debatable Jungian "archtypes" or latent memory traces inherited from one's past via or into the "collective unconscious". Whatever the fortune of this Jungian view may be, it may not be amiss to remind ourselves that in conception two living cells unite, and who knows what other characteristics may be transmitted than those discovered thus far genetically! Viz. is it possible that "...visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me" has some bearing on the inheritance of psychical influences?

(6) Consider, viz., two people whose bodily makeups are such that at relatively early chronological age are in the post-pubertal stage, one of these lives in the sex-emblazoned atmosphere of almost any U.S. town, the other in some sex-repressing locality or in a non-sex-emphasizing milieu. Tho the sex urges might seem equally strong in each, they actually could be quite un-equal because of the environmental factors.

this "inner molding" can be influenced significantly by the specific quality of these spiritual features as reflected in his particular environment; in other words, what others consider to be nice, or good, or sacred are likely to influence him.

The "What am I?" therefore, cannot be completely divorced from one's parentage nor from one's own complete past with its specific circumstances and happenstances. Thus the already complex statically considered composit is further complicated by the dynamic thrustings of one's both "trans-personal" and personal past as well as by significant periodic changes in one's stretchable present. It is a truism, but it does make a difference not only to but in the person how long one has lived as well as how and where.

CAPACITIES OF THE PERSON.

This complicated unity does not exist in a sheerly unperturbed state as a sort of self-contained blob. It exercises itself multitudinously. This multitude of activities stems from a number of capacities inherent in the very nature of the human being. These capacities, however, are not in themselves necessarily discrete in their operation; if not all, at least many of them in varying combinations overlap, interpenetrate, and interfluence each other even though they are cognitively distinguishable. The somewhat readily recognizable ones are those of:

- 1) living, in the sheer physiological "animaline" sense but also in other senses as a sort of "psychicaline" ongoing;
- 2) doing, in its various ramifications of working, playing moving, resting, etc.;
- 3) wanting, in its various forms of needs, drives, desires, aspirations, etc.;
- 4) feeling, with its various differentiations of loving, hating, fearing, being ashamed, angry, dejected, jealous, grieved, etc.;
- 5) imagining, in its reproductive and creative variants;
- 6) remembering, passively in the sense of retaining and actively as recall and/or recognition;
- 7) knowing, in its various distinguishable forms such as sensory perceiving, reasoning, intuiting, reflecting, understanding;
- 8) believing, in the sense of accepting as already so that which one does not as yet know to be so;
- 9) forgiving - as a specific kind of activity this does not seem reducible to nor includable in the others, although it does have some of these others involved in it; to forget is one thing, to forgive is quite another in the latter there may still be memory of the deed but the bitterness, the "hurt", is obliterated;
- 10) sociating, in the sense as being a capacity for influencing, or being influenced by others as human beings;

- 11) communicating, in the sense of the capacity not merely to give expression to but also to share meanings with others by means of a language which may be gestural, graphic, or vocal in its presentation, or perhaps by some direct or non-linguistic means;
- 12) valuating, as a capacity to be aware of worth and to discriminate among them;
- 13) sympathizing, in its inception this is not first of all a "feeling" but rather a capacity for identifying oneself emotionally and/or otherwise with a condition or state of one's fellow being;
- 14) creating, in the sense of purposive arranging or re-arranging, combining or re-combining what already is into something which previously did not so exist for the sake of utility, beauty, control, efficiency, or other reason;
- 15) serving, in the sense of committing or dedicating oneself to an object or goal.⁽⁷⁾

There is great likelihood that this listing is not exhaustive, some of the more obvious as well as the more subtle ones may have been overlooked. There also may be sufficient serious overlapping so that the ones given could be reduced to a few number. But the point that should not be overlooked is that however one lists them they are inherent capacities, and more importantly that "What am I" is in a large way defined by the extent and quality of the exercise of these resident capacities. But it should be noted too that these capacities do not exercise themselves nebulously or unconditionally, rather they are exercised in and, if not determined by at least, are strongly influenced by the host of factors operative in the previously discussed complex unity.

Manifestations of the Person.

Though these capacities inhere in the very nature of the human being, they do not function autonomously. They are potentialities which the person does or can actualize through exercise. It is the person that is (7) It is worthy to note that in this list are some capacities peculiarly or distinctively human, and that still others (common with the animals) are or can be exercised in ways peculiar to humans. Examples of the former are valuating, serving, believing, forgiving, sympathizing; and of the latter are creating (in the artisan as well as artistic sense); communicating via symbols instead of only signs; feeling as in love, sorrow, shame; wanting in the sense of goals for aspiration; and knowing at least in the sense of involving symbols, understanding, reflection, etc.

Some may be surprised that "sinning" is not included in this list of capacities. Whether it should be included depends largely on whether one considers "sin" something positive or negative (tho active), something substantial or privative, a capacity or a way in which capacities may be or are exercised. My outlook in the present context is that functionally (not ethically, of course) sinning is something like forgetting (i.e. not remembering); in other words, sinning is exercising one's capacities in ways he should not, or not exercising them when he should.

the subject of these capacities, he is their owner, possessor, or master. He exercises them, partly because he is forced to and partly because he wants to. He must exercise most, if not all, of these capacities sheerly through force of circumstance, i.e. through the interplay of the person and his environment. It is man's nature so to do. Animals may function subject-less, their activities may be dictated by the very pattern of their neural heritage (instincts, or inborn behavior patterns). Man's nature is much more flexible, it incorporates very few ready made ways of behaving. Hence, he must "make" his ways of behaving, usually because of the circumstances in which he finds himself but also because he has the ability to shape circumstance (not absolutely but conditionally). The human being can do these things because he is in a real sense "lord" of his capacities. But each does not exercise this "lordship" in the same way. Significant with respect to the specific person is how he exercises these capacities, the direction in which he exercises them, and the extent to which he does this. It is these differentia which constitute the qualitative structure of each person. By these means the distinctiveness of each person becomes "lucent" though not necessarily translucent. And, it may be added, by these means the person shows his personality i.e. the quality distinctive of his "personness."

If it be granted that "What am I" is a unity, a very complex one of physical-and-psychical features, then it ought not to be considered strange that the qualitative distinctiveness of the person, the what-kind-of-a-person-it-is, comes to expression in a variety of ways both obvious and subtle. The person as a totality, as a particular kind of complex unity, enters into or expresses himself in practically everything the person as person does. Activities which seem appendixical or accidental may actually reveal perduring qualities of the person. The person reflects himself wittingly or unwittingly in many ways.

Thus what seem to be only bodily features can be revelatory of the person. How a person holds his bones and muscles together, i.e. his body posture, often reveals something of his general feeling state (whether sad or glad, angry or scared), and of his general attitude toward himself or others (haughty, humble, indifferent, unconcerned). So too the look on one's face may reveal much more than usually caught by a passing glance: a really disturbed interior can hardly be camouflaged by cosmetics, inner contentment radiates outwardly into facial expression, the rigidly schematized person is not likely to be facially flexible. One's voice can and usually does communicate more than the meaning of the words, its general tone can reveal much about the person's general demeanor (over-confidence, mousy, naggy, etc.). One's handwriting is much more than a sort of appendix-like muscular action, characteristics of the person come to expression in the movements made in the writing. And the person can reveal much about himself in his free-hand drawings(8)

(8) In this country experiments have been made in which judges compared separately prepared brief personality sketches with selected specimens of handwriting, drawings, voice recordings, and gestures. The persons involved were unknown to the judges. Not all were correctly matched but the number of correct ones were appreciably above chance expectations. Cf. Hilgard, Ernest R., Intro. to Psych. 1953; p. 423. In Europe, much use for diagnostic purposes is made of handwriting analysis.

It may take experts to ferret out these and various other ways (e.g. by projective techniques), to set up the criteria or means by which these can be isolated, and to decipher or interpret the results. But all this does not vitiate the fact that the individual does manifest something of his own person in what seem to be merely bodily instrumentalities.

More significantly, or at least more noticeably, the individual's person manifests himself in his dealings with other persons and with his own self, in the aptitudes he displays and the skills he acquires, in the character of his ability to adjust to situations old or new, in his temperament or fundamental emotional disposition, in the degree of balance he achieves in and among the exercises of his various capacities, in the gaining of knowledge and the use that is made of it, in the interests he has, in the aims he projects and the values he incorporates, in his idiosyncrasies as well as in his peculiar flavor of common traits and habits, in the attitudes or predispositions he has developed, in the prejudices he maintains, in the quality of his motivations, and in the tenor of his general outlook on life.

Someone had tallied at least 17,953 words in our language used to distinguish the behavior of one person from another.⁽⁹⁾ Contemporary psychology one gives is revised, repudiated, or replaced by another. There is yet no common agreement on this score.

How personality manifests itself is an intriguing subject. It could well be a major treatise in itself. It is precisely this aspect of personality which, aside from the purely academic, is usually considered the more interesting and in fact the more important. We are, and most of our lives we deal with, personalities. Yet, though we may know quite a bit about the "personness" of the individual (like we may know quite a bit about the weather), our knowledge of a specific personality as a uniqueness in its rich individuality is more a matter for artistic description than scientific analysis (like the beauty of a spring day or the ominous quality of a passing thunderstorm). But this does not gainsay the fact that the present sub-topic deserves more adequate treatment than given here.

THE "UNIQUE BEING" OF THE PERSON.

Although there are many other aspects that could or should be included in a discussion of "what am I?", there is at least one which should not be excluded. This is the aspect of "unique being". Psychologists in general recognize this aspect, but there are vast differences in the explanations. For some, the uniqueness of each individual is nothing more than the peculiar organization or constellation of the person's physical and psychical make-up, the person is nothing other than the intra-individual organization.⁽¹⁰⁾ Others either tacitly

(9) Cf. Hilgard, *opp. cit.*, p. 417

(10) Personality is the fundamental organization of the individual which determines the unique nature or individuality of his interactions with himself and with his environment." (sic). Ruch, Floyd, L., *Psychology and Life*, 4th ed., 1953, P.30. Similarly, many discussions of the "self" consider the self either - 1) as a group of processes such as thinking, (continued in footnotes of page 11)

assume (11) or openly avow (12)^a that the person is more than his intra-personal organization.

It must be admitted that I am in a real sense the peculiar organization of all the things that have gone, are, and go into my being. Viewed objectively the person is the intra-individual organization. But an adequately objective approach should also take cognizance of something that is subjective; i.e. of that which is doing this objective viewing. When this is done, it appears that I am in just as real a sense also something more than this organization. It may not be possible to characterize adequately what this "more than" is. But there are some things at the descriptive level which can be said about it: though it be within the organization this "more than" is something which can recognize and understand various things about the organization and about its own self, it is something which can refer to itself in this organization, and it is something which in at least some ways organizes the organization in which it is embedded, hence it is in a real sense "other than" the organization itself.

Some of the things that influence me in making me be what I am seem to be organized within me or for me, at least not by me. But there also seem to be at least some things that I organize within myself or for myself. Though these latter are actively and intentionally organized, not all of them are organized consciously. Perhaps only a small quantity of my total way of life is thus directed, and even among these the intrusion of other factors may make the "outcome" different than I originally intended (so that the "organizer" aspect seems to be blurred). There may also be times when I more or less consciously selected (which in turn also involves organization as well as organizer) items in seemingly isolated fashion yet turn out over a period of time to form a pattern that becomes part of the organization of me (e.g. habits, attitudes) thus seemingly obliterating the ingredient of organizer. But there nevertheless is active organizing. Even the seeming disorganization of dreams, at least of some of them, may reflect the organizer aspect of me. Dreams often seem to have an impersonal character as if

(10) continued from page 10 footnotes - remembering, perceiving, or, 2) as an object i.e. his attitudes, feelings, and evaluations of himself. But none consider him as SUBJECT. Psychology in this country has long been busy de-humanizing the human being by emphasizing only his continuities with the animals, but in more recent times it has also become busy in de-personalizing him, i.e. considering him only as process or product NEVER as producer or processor. In fact, the subject or agent aspect is explicitly denied. Cf. Linsey and Hall, *op. cit.* p. 468.

(11) By personality "we mean the sum of his attributes and qualities as a person and the way they are integrated into a total way of life." Jersild, Arthur T., *The Psychology of Adolescence*, 1957; p. 351. "The self includes all that a person embraces in the words I, me, mine, myself. It is within each person, the core and substance of his experience as a human being. Idem, p. 17.

(12)^a "Unfortunately, they (i.e. the psychologists) have been handicapped by an utterly inadequate concept of human nature that has been the heritage of modern philosophy." Gannon, Timothy J., *Psychology: The Unity of Human Behavior*, 1954; p. 13.

"One can think of a number of sciences in which the existence of the soul is quite irrelevant, but psychology is not one of them." Idem, p. 17.

the dreamer detachedly is spectating jumbled snatches of happenings or situation unrelated to each other or to the dreamer. Of course, dreams may have very personal involvements too at the level of the dream itself. But whatever their character, the obvious point should not be overlooked that they are the specific person's dreams, that the person is in some sense the producer of his dreams. The dream is not something passively injected into the person, nor merely a passive on-going in a peculiar organization, but the outcome or product of an active "something", influenced, it is true, but not necessarily strictly determined by the organizational features alone.

This is not the place to digress on the dynamics and significance of dreams, interesting and important though that may be. The matter was brought in at this point to indicate that the "organizer" can be actively operative even though he is not consciously intending it, and further that this "organizer" aspect is "something more" than or "other than" the organization even though it is paradoxically interwoven with it. The Gestaltists and depth psychologists are to be credited for returning this aspect to psychological focus, although psychologists of ultra-scientific bent continue to rule out or ignore this aspect of personality because it is not (or at least has not been) amenable to accepted ways of research (12)b. Granted that the ultimate nature of this "more than" is elusive descriptively, its actual existence does not therefore cease functionally nor is its reality extinguished because it is denied or ignored (this holds in the material realm too, e.g. electricity).

What kinds of things this organizer or "core" (13) aspect can recognize about its own self, are disputable. One's basic commitments, knowledge, or preconceived notions are likely to interfere with or infiltrate even a deliberate attempt to limit oneself faithfully to the actual existential situation. The following are intended to be things which the "core" can in some way become aware about its own self. At rare moments we may intuit its being, but in most moments we take for granted its existence. (14) It seems to be something distinguishable from but not disjuncted from the rest of one's being. (15) It is not reducible to intellect, nor will, nor emotion, nor to a mere combination of them; it seems in some ways to be

- (12)b To rule out as non-existent that which cannot be known or investigated by accepted methods, is, to say the least, a gratuitous assumption methodologically and logically an instance of the fallacy of "begging the question."
- (13) It is difficult to hit upon a label which on the one hand is not already impregnated with connotations from previous usage in psychology and which on the other hand does not in itself have misleading connotations as to nature, locus, or function (e.g. "id", heart, self, etc.)
- (14) It is questionable whether babies do, or idiots, or those whose existence for one reason or another approaches the vegetative.
- (15) The early Greeks seem to have put Western thought on a side track for ages in this matter, and in the modern era Descartes accentuated the detour. Democritus wanted to reduce everything to material entities, and he still has many followers. To much of mankind, however, both in his day and subsequently, this notion was repugnant. In the attempt (continued at bottom of page 13)

something more basic than any one of them and in other ways to be more than all of them together. (16) In some instances this "core" influences the direction of thought, will, and emotion, but in other instances it is not itself impervious to these; in other words, there is also the possibility that within limits it is also influenced or molded by its own activities (e.g. by its unconscious motivations; this is something like saying that it is a sort of director which can be changed by directives of its own or from some other source (e.g. "re-generation," sanctification, hypnosis). (17)

This "core" is thus not only something active but also something that can be acted upon (either by itself or by some other source) in a manner that somehow changes it, if not in its structure then at least in its functionings. It is something changeable, or at least a very significant aspect of it is changeable. The changes in many persons may never be great, in others they may be very noticeable either over a long period of time or by some radical upheaval (e.g. "re-birth," constant sanctifying of self, an abrupt personality change such as a soldier might undergo in stress of combat, or psychotic disorders in general).

Paradoxically, this "core" is on the other hand also something constant and rather consistent, though not necessarily fixed. There is a perdurance of generic tendencies. The "core" exerts itself in ways that are not capricious, although it is possible that some human beings have "capriciousness" as their main characteristic but this then is itself in some sense a "non-capricious" perduring tendency.

(continued from footnotes, page 12)

- (15) to do justice to the non-material aspects of reality Plato not only sharply differentiated the two but had them exist rather disjunctedly in the human being. Descartes accentuated the division so acutely that Western thought (theological and psychological as well as philosophical) has perennially been afflicted with the problem. One of the supposedly big problems here lies in the area of causation; namely, that "like can only influence like", a rather persistent theoretic issue which ordinary experience seems to belie.
- (16) Apparently struggling to describe this aspect, Freud breaks up the "core" along ethical lines: the "id" being the primordial "bad" urges and the "superego" an equally basic urging to curb one line of activity and to do another in accordance with some pattern or "rule."
- (17) Cf. infra, Postscript.
- (18) It should perhaps be injected that this characteristic of perduring tendencies of the "core" normally does not function in isolation from nor by insulation from the rest of one's being. There are reciprocating and intertwining functional relations between the "core" and the rest of one's being even though the result is not always an integrated product. These functional interrelations may be or become distorted or even dislocated, but it is a serious question whether such can then always be ascribed solely either to the one or to the other, in at least most cases it may be a reciprocating influence between both.

The "core" is thus also that aspect of the person which functions as the responsible agent as viewed by oneself as well as by others. Because the individual in some way intuitively feels himself as a constellation of perduring tendencies, he somehow feels that it is he, the same he, who now praises or blames himself for what he said or did then. (19)

Connected with this feeling of responsibility are some other aspects. The "core" is or can become aware of itself as something continuous, as something which remains identical through change: the person who wakes up feels himself to be the same as the one who went to sleep, that it is the same something which last week experienced so and so and today thus and thus even though these experienced items are not themselves necessarily related in any other way, the awareness of continuity remains even though one forgets sizable segments in it (one of the most terrifying illnesses, depersonalization, is a mental state in which one no longer recognizes his experiences as belonging to himself). This "core" also becomes aware of itself as something moral (in its broadest sense), as something which distinguishes bad from good and which chooses between or among them. Besides being the sort of thing which concerns itself with value, the "core" also senses itself as a center of value, i.e. as itself valuable: there is quite a different feeling between being bumped by another and being insulted or belittled, even babies at a rather early age seem sensitive about themselves as value.

A related feature of this "core" is that at least some of its activities are of the "striving" kind. This activity need not be merely of the kind which many psychologists describe by the term homeostasis. It is not indigenous to the nature of the "core" to become active only sufficiently to return to a state of inactivity, of adjusting to the needs of the moment and then being quiescent again. Rather, this "core" does or can seek more than equilibrium, it struggles not merely to overcome a disturbed state or to get rid of something but to gain something, to reach beyond. And it is characteristic of the essential nature of this "core" that it can in turn be influenced by that toward which it reaches; in other words, that the goals it projects can function dynamically in

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- (19) Strangely this sensitivity to responsibility seems in many people to operate more pronouncedly from the present to the past than from the present for the future. But what has happened when it is lacking altogether? In the present framework it could mean either that the "core" has never had or achieved an inner stability or integratedness in spite of its constancy, or that some of the organizational components of the individual's entire psycho-physical make-up for one reason or another were or have become so disrupted among themselves that their interinfluencing affect on the "core" is likewise disrupting (e.g. as the result of injury, disease, heredity). This doesn't mean that the "core" isn't constant, nor that it lacks generic tendencies, nor that these generic tendencies aren't stable (although it may be that they are not) but that they aren't integrated. And it's a further question whether this non-integratedness, whether of shorter or longer duration, is sheerly a matter of the nature of this "core" itself or of the total compositional and dynamic organization in which the "core" is imbedded and with which it is intertwined.

its strivings.

It is exactly in its striving that the "core" can become most acutely aware of itself. In ordinary sensory perception the general tenor of the awareness is more that of something other-than-self. In certain types of intense intellectual activity the self can become so engrossed that it seemingly is absorbed in it; that is to say, the "core" seems to lose or at least lack any specific awareness of itself. But in emotional experiences there can be rather direct awareness of the "core"; and in volitional activity it can become acutely so: the more intense the willing becomes the more one can experience the "core" in it, the more I want something, the more I become aware of the "I" that wants it (in certain types of mental aberrations, this "I" awareness can reach exaggerative proportions).

There is in the continuity of the "core" also an element of unifier and unifying. The "core" seems to be a fluid, dynamic continuum in which past wells into present like waves following upon each other in an endless sea. In this process the unifying need not be consciously cogitated, though it is in some sense mental. In fact, if anything is to be said about the general nature of this "core" it can be said that it is mental in a most generic sense. But what this "mental" in turn is can only be described as different from material, its meaning must apparently be intuited. This basic mental, however, intertwined as it is with the material in the human being nevertheless manifests itself in a variety of ways. When this mental takes on or expresses itself in the form of consciously directed thought, it can so speak check back upon itself. But when it does this in a conceptualized way, it must "segmentize" and thus break up its own content into discrete or separable units so that viz. even one's own past seems to be episodic, isolated items which are then related into a continuity. But there is a sense in which consciously directed thought can in some non-intellectuated or at least unconceptualized way get an intuition of itself as a continuum within which the unifying is being done as a function of the "core".

The unifier, however, is always something that evades the process of being scrutinized. The most one seemingly can get of it is that by some sort of intuition there is an aspect of the "core" which always remains the subject and at that moment eludes being its own object, as that which ties together and in the process is itself not tied, as analyzing and yet not at that moment analyzed, as the dreamer in his daydreaming and yet itself not at that moment in the dreamed.

There most likely are still other discernible features about the "core" aspect of personality that are knowable by attending solely to the existential situation. But the final characteristic to be treated here is that of "uniqueness." The uniqueness referred to here is not that it is a human core as distinguished from those of animals, if they have any; but of the individual human being's uniqueness. To describe this uniqueness is futile; it is precisely the ineffable quality that makes each person distinguished from others. Theoretically, identical twins may have everything the same except that of occupying the same position in space at the same time, yet there is something about each that makes them different personalities; there's something about their

"core" aspects that distinguishes them as different persons, and sometimes quite noticeably so. (20) What this "something" is, is descriptively inaccessible, it is not something theoretically calculated but intuitively recognized even though one gets to know it only comparatively (i.e. to say, it is not likely that a person would intuit his own uniqueness independent of contact with other people).

As intimated before, the "core" is a complex simplicity which is elusive descriptively though ever present experientially. Much of its richness and profundity can be intuited; some of its aspects can be inferred. Its reality can command deepest loyalty from others but also can bring about the greatest havoc within oneself. To conceptualize it is to emasculate its verve and disembowel its contents. Yet it is exactly this procedure that it must make use of in its attempt to communicate something about itself.

Summary

An attempt has been made to analyze the make-up or structure of the person. There most likely are significant gaps in the enumeration of the constitutive factors, and of those given the treatment may not have been uniformly proportional to the role each plays in the interrelated totality.

The main thrust of what was attempted here is that when considered from the standpoint of his structure the person is not something sheerly conscious or self-conscious, nor even something vacuously or disjunctedly psychical. The person is intellectually distinguishable as the unique core of the human being, but functionally this "core" is interfused with or enmeshed in the coalescence of many factors dynamically operative in, thru, and upon the spatio-temporal being which embodies this uniqueness and which in a real sense is the embodiment as well as a constituent of the uniqueness. Grossly oversimplified, this comes down to considering the person as soul-and-body instead of soul and body (i.e. the word "and" is to be construed conjunctively instead of enumeratively).

The topic as assigned could as well have been treated from any of several standpoints; e.g. the dynamics of the person resulting from the interplay of its unconscious and conscious forces and the relationship this has to personality, or the characterology of personality in the sense of how personality manifests itself outwardly and by what means others come to recognize what its main qualities are, or the development of personality, etc.

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- (20) Consider for a moment what a mess it would be for both the person and the social group if identical twins (or any one else, for that matter) did not each recognize himself and his experiences as unique! Suppose one of the twins telephoned the other and asked, "who's talking", and the other replied, "It's I", to which the one replied, "Oh no you aren't, you're I!", or suppose I claimed your memories as mine!

However, the topic as formulated allows for the present approach and contains hint of further treatment. At any rate, it may not have been amiss to focus attention on, to strive for a clearer definition of, and to come to common agreement on the existential structure of the person as a needed prelude to discussion of the manifestation of the person (i. e. personality).

The "Christian" Aspect of Personality.

It may be charged that the title speaks of working towards a Christian concept of personality, and that thus far there has been nothing specifically Christian in the treatment.

In a sense, such an indictment is correct. But it poses a problem which some might even consider a major issue. The problem is, at what point does the "specifically Christian" enter into a discussion such as this; and the major issue may be "what is meant by Christian" in this context.

With respect to the latter, a simple reply would be that if the main ideas expressed in the above analysis are true (a sizable assumption!), then they are to that extent also Christian truth.(21) If some or all of these ideas turn out to be not true, they are not Christian even though a Christian believes and says them.

The "specifically Christian", it seems to me, enters into the present discussion at a different level or from a different approach than that given. It stems from a concern about person and personality which is other than that which intends to be psychologically descriptive. The "specifically Christian" aspects in the present context are not knowable items about the structure of personality, but they are aspects which enter as beliefs about the origin, nature, and destiny of personality. As such they are relevant and significant for an overall view of personality, and for the Christian's sub species aeternitatis they are unspeakably more important than the psychologically descriptive. They are, in fact, necessary ingredients in the Christian concept of person and personality. But their locus in this concept is at a different level. They are beliefs about person and personality they are not part of the descriptive knowables of person and personality.

It needs remarking that any cogitated treatment of personality will presuppose beliefs on these matters. In some instances such beliefs may intentionally or unintentionally filtrate into an analysis which purports to be purely descriptive of the existential structure. But when- or where-ever such infiltrations occur, they should be recognized for what

(21) But to speak of Christian truth is confusing. It seems to indicate that Christian truth is different from non-Christian truth with respect to the characteristic of "truthness". Hence, to speak of Christian and non-Christian truth, as far as truth-quality (or truth value) is concerned, is to make a distinction that is misleading, not real, or at least ambiguous.

they are: beliefs, whether specifically Christian or violently anti-Christian. (22)

What are these specifically Christian beliefs that have bearing on the origin, nature, and destiny of man? It may not be easy to enumerate all of them in detail. Nor can these always be formulated in a manner that elicits common consent on the part of those who claim to hold them. The following are intended to be some cardinal Christian beliefs that do have bearing on and seem to me to be involved in the Christian concept of personality.

In respect to the primordial origin of man, the Christian belief is that such is not the product of chance but of Divine intention, that man was created as man by God as Triune Being and more specifically by the Second Person of the Trinity. The origin of the person, of a concrete or specific human being, has continued to be a problem in Christianity, at least in the Reformed branch of it. A plausible view in this matter is a combination of the so-called traducianistic and creationistic theories. In such a view the uniqueness of each personality is something in each case created or generated by God in the "core" aspect which is interfused with the entire physical and psychical make-up influenced by heredity and by environment. (23)

With respect to the "humanness" of man's being, the Christian belief is not that this is both primordially and existentially exclusively a product of "socialization", but that this consists in being created in the image of God, that it is precisely the reflecting of Divinity which constitutes the essential difference between the human being and other beings. Granted that there are certain continuities and similarities between man and the animals, there are in man certain capacities exercisable

(22) The wholesome Christian view is one which itself rather clearly recognizes what the character, area, and contents of its beliefs are. Beliefs about what we do or can know are one thing; beliefs about what will always have to be believed are quite another. The very heart of the Christian view is the acceptance of certain things only and wholly and always by faith. "Faith" has a locus in the intellectual pursuit too, but its status is temporary, not terminal; e.g. in the use of hypotheses I tentatively accent something as being so in order to prove, to know, or to understand it as so by my investigation. But the "belief" element referred to above is a perduring trust, a continuing affirmation of one's entire being in accepting as being so what one in this life cannot actually know is so. "Thru faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, ..." Hebr. XI:3a. In short, beliefs that always will remain beliefs are involved in the Christian concept of personality. Though this is perhaps obvious, it is wholesome to remain aware of it.

(23) Admittedly this still leaves problems with respect to the human personality of Christ. The Biblical account seems to imply that His prenatal development as well as His post-natal was similar to that of other humans. Could it be that as Second Person Creator the "core" aspect of His human personality was such that it could resist the evil tendencies resident in the interfused physico-psychical aspects of that part of His being contributed by or developed within Mary? What does it mean that "He was tempted in all things, like as we", if He were not in some real sense also part of us?

in a manner that constitute qualitative discontinuities from the animal and other capacities that are distinctively peculiar to man. It is these essential differences between man and animal which constitute the imaging of God thus marking man off as a human being.

The notion of "the image of God" in man deserves more than passing attention. In Christian circles the notion seems to be (though not necessarily explicitly expressed) that God created man as a human being and that "the image of God" is a sort of super-additum, an extra something, which man "lost" in the fall. If Scripture is to be taken at its face value on this matter, then the situation is quite otherwise. In a very real sense man has not lost "the image of God", (24) rather it is exactly this which constitutes his humanness structurally. "Let us make man in our image," and after the "fall" it is repeatedly said, " . . . for in the image of God created He him (i.e. man)." Man's humanness does not consist in the he looks, but in what he is; in respect to his outer appearance man could as well be classed as merely another species of animals, it is his inner capacities which mark man off as a distinctive type of creature.

There is, for example, the Divine-like capacity of not being limited exclusively to one's "here's" and "now's" with all the implications this has for knowing, communicating, loving, hating, sympathizing, imagining, etc. Each animal, so we believe, is limited in its experiences to the spaces it has occupied in the moments it has lived. God, so we believe, is not limited to any space or time. Man, as a sort of composite of earth and heaven, of elements of the creation and the Creator, is not limited as the animals are, yet not unlimited as God is. But man does image God in his capacity to transcend his spatio-temporal finiteness via imagination, memory, reasoning, understanding, etc. Man can thus deal with or be concerned about things in spaces and/or times other than the one's he has occupied, and even with things that transcend any time or space. (25) Man can therefore be said to reflect something of the omnipresence of Divinity.

(24) Reformed theology recognizes this in its position that man lost the Divine image in the narrow sense yet retained it in the broader sense. But whatever be the fortune of this distinction in the technical theological circles, in the ordinary circles of discussion little is done in any concrete way with this "broader sense." It is understandable that from the soteriological standpoint more emphasis is placed on what man lost than on what he has retained with respect to "the image of God." Yet from the psychological standpoint (as well as many others including the theological) it is not at all insignificant to focus attention on what man has retained of "the image of God" because it is precisely this which still makes and keeps people human beings. Explicit recognition of what makes human beings human, of what all people are by virtue of the very way the human race was made creatively, could have beneficent results in some discussions which proceed as if "sin" and "grace" were the only factors involved.

(25) Non-Christian psychologists, of course, also grant the fact of such "symbolic" knowledge, but they have a different belief in accounting for it.

Other aspects of Divinity are also recognizable in man. These are, of course, always derivative, finite, creaturely, God-like; not original, unlimited, Creatorly, or God-ful. E.g. God is fully conscious of Who and What He is, man is only partially so but to this extent he does reflect the self-conscious aspect of God. Again within the Trinity there is perfect communicability, man's reflection of this is limited, but it is far above that of the animals in that he has capacities to express and to share meanings which transcend the spatio-temporal moment. So too, God knows and understands all, man only in part; but the very fact that man can know both intuitively or directly and symbolically is itself a reflection of Divinity; and via conceptualizable communication the individual acquisitions can become cumulative thus limitedly proximating Divine noetic content and noetic ability and unlimitedly distancing the animals. The all-controlling power of God is delegated and reflected in man's capacity to govern and regulate. God's prerogative is that of immediate creation (to make out of nothing) but human beings reflect His mediated creativity in their capacity to combine and recombine what already is into something which did not so exist before; whatever there be of this in the animal realm is of the nonself-conscious kind. Nor do animals have the capacity to make tools to extend the power of their inner strength, in this man thus reflects something of Divine omnipotence. It is not sacrilegious to say that God worships Himself, serves His own purposes; derivatively man's nature is to serve something. Among creatures only man can laugh. And so one could go on, the Divine image is reflected in man's capacities to forgive, to choose, to be responsible, to show compassion, to love, to hate, to trust. It is these and more that make the very nature of man's makeup a human being, a something other than and more than a living, moving, conscious animal.

The characteristics cited here reflect the Divine as discernible in the conscious areas of man's being. Some are also discernible in the unconscious areas. There is, for example, the aspect of "timelessness" in man's mental being somewhat analagous to God's "one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years are as a day." That is to say, in the dynamics of the unconscious the uni-directional continuum of actual experience seems to be gone; that which at the conscious level seems dim or forgotten past can in the unconscious area be as vividly present and/or operative as the most recent, the faraway as real as the nearby (in dreams, all seems often to be an interscrambled continuous present). Whether this "timelessness" is limited to intra-generational content or also inter-generational, is a moot point. Then too, there seems to be something about or in the unconscious that is so to speak relentlessly legislative, an urge to patternize, to conform or to make conform to some sort of regulation, a compellingness to "hew to a line", a sort of generic non-conscious awareness that there is good and bad.

I am rather certain that these features do not exhaust the distinguishable components of the "image of God" in man. In fact, it is questionable whether an adequate investigation of this matter should limit

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- (26) This is not to be confused with "conscience", at least not from its material or content standpoint which is more or less consciously learned or at least culturally determined. Could it be that Paul had in mind this "unconscious legislativeness" in Romans II:14?

itself to that which is discernible in a single human being. "Let us make man in our image" may have the implication that no single human being reflects the totality of this "image", that it takes wedded pairs, families, whole races, and even the totality of mankind in all of human history from its beginning to its end to reflect this "image" totally and perhaps never adequately. (27)

A third main Christian belief that bears directly on personality has to do with the ethical character of human nature. It is commonly granted as a fact that human beings do wrong. The Christian belief is that basically this is due not to poor training, stavism, or ignorance, but to an ingrained tendency to perversity, a tincture present in every aspect of man's being which in any way involves a moral element (i.e. the element of choice). (28)

This much seems agreed upon by Christians. But whether this perverse streak is such that it always does exert its distorting tendency in everything man does morally, or whether this persisting perverse streak may exert itself at any time with respect to anything that in

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- (27) If the Christian belief is that it is "the image of God" which is the constitutive feature of man's distinctiveness in the creature world, and if this "image" consists at least in part of the kind of characteristics suggested here, then this belief ought to enter seriously into the Christian notion of person and personality. If it is true that it is the image of God in man and this alone that makes man human, then the converse is also true that as long as man is human he is an image bearer of God. It may seem almost insulting expressly to state such a truism. But the implications of this for discussion on personality, knowledge, and kindred subjects seem sometimes to be completely lost or ignored in speculations thriving in Christian circles.

The implications are not only academic but also practical. E.g., because all human beings have God-like capacities not only does knowledge become possible but individually gained knowledge can not only become self-consciously expressed but also socially communicated, i.e. shared by others; and because humanness consists of Divine reflections, psycho-therapy is possible: within each individual human being there is not only the seed and fruit of the distorting and disrupting influence of sin but also the seed and the possible fruit of the straightening, restraining, and healing influence (e.g. forgiving) of properly exercising various inherent God-like capacities such as the deep-seated urge for some sort of regulatoriness, for sociality (i.e. the deep longing for attention from and giving attention to others), and communicability (i.e. the ability to unburden oneself and to be upheld or comforted by another), as well as other socio-genic and ego-genic needs.

- (28) This does not mean that "will" as a separate vacuous faculty is corrupted but not intellect or emotion; rather, what is meant here is that "willing" is involved in and intertwined with various distinguishable functions of man's mentality. Another way of saying this is that sin has not obliterated the image of God in man, but it has distorted its exercise; man still has the capacities which are Divine reflections (else he wouldn't be human), but these God-like capacities are not exercised by the person in God-like ways.

anyway involves man's moral capacity, is apparently a moot question among Christians themselves. (29)

The final basic Christian belief bearing on personality has to do with its destiny. The Christian belief is not that this destiny is death as the end, but that man's temporal existence has external significance, that man's destiny lies beyond the grave, that human life is everlasting, that there is a final judgment which determines the character of one's everlasting life, that the blissful character of this everlasting life can be attained only in a certain way in the here and now, and kindred beliefs related to the "immortality of the soul." It is no startling news that at least some non-Christians have these beliefs too, but the material contents of the beliefs differ. The material contents of the Christian beliefs in this area thus naturally affect the Christian concept of person and personality in ways that conform to this content.

One of these "affects" has to do with death. What takes place at death? What is it that dies? What remains? (It is empirically evident that the "unity" of the individual is gone and that the somatic aspect disintegrates but what about the "psychical" aspects interfused with the somatic, likewise the personality and the person aspects of the "unity" not only from the formal but also the material-content standpoints - in short, the sum-total of this life's unconscious and conscious experiences as well as capacities: do all these disintegrate or become annihilated too?) What is the "state" of that which does not die? These are questions which rather perennially have perplexed and tantalized Christian thinkers and writers.

It is admitted that the view presented in this paper on the structure of the person as coalescence of many components, offers no easy solution. What part of the person survives death? All of the psychical, or only the "core" aspect (i.e. only the "subject" per se divested of all its accumulated forming)? Has the life lived here meant anything at all for the individual in his totality not only for the here and now but also for the hereafter? More baffling questions could be forthcoming. But in terms of the view presented in this paper it is quite germane to add that another Christian belief about man's destiny relevant to personality is the belief in "the resurrection of the body." This could be construed as meaning that ultimately personality is an organismic unity of physical-psychical factors with a unique "core" not only here and now but also in the final hereafter; that death thus is an "unnatural" state in which elements of the totality of the human individual are somehow asundered and preserved in a way not in keeping with their nature; or else that death simply is death, not in a final

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- (29) Orthodox Christians like to cite Freud's explanation of "id" as the best naturalistic counterpart of their doctrine of total depravity. But in justice to the total situation they ought then also to recognize Freud's ego and super-ego as naturalistic counterparts of their belief of "the image of God"; Freud's super-ego is just as illogical and insatiable urging to adhere to "law" and order (of an unconscious kind) as "id" is to disorder, and "ego" is the part that seeks for self-preservation of the person and keeping life on a sensible or even level.

sense but as a temporary cessation of functioning as a person as proximated in our lives in deep dreamless sleep. Still other explanations are most likely plausible. But it may be part of wisdom to leave death a mystery. (30)

CONCLUSION.

Whether this paper has addressed itself to the topic as assigned, is a moot point. The answer in a large part could depend on how the term "personality" is construed.

It has been assumed throughout this paper that there is a difference between "person" and "personality." Although I have not carefully and explicitly explicated this distinction, I have assumed "personality" to be the form, the expression, or the coming to manifestation of the "person"; it is the total structure and dynamic of the "person" as these are incorporated and expressed in his daily living. (31) I consider "person" to be the ground for or sub-structure of "personality"; it is the source from which "personality" gets its shape. Hence, in a sense this paper can be considered as concerning itself with a prior question: What is a Christian concept of "person"? and then more specifically from the structural rather than from the dynamic standpoint. What we ordinarily call "personality" is strictly speaking not identifiable with the "person" from its structural aspect but more closely allied with the dynamic aspect of the person. And this alliance in turn is seemingly not so much with the "why" of the dynamics as with the "how"; in other words, "personality" has to do with how the person exercises his varied capacities, with the shape he gives to them, with the extent, quality, and direction of their exercise.

In the light of this distinction I have limited myself in this project to making more explicit some of the main features in the exceedingly complex and yet bafflingly simple structure of man when viewed psychologically. An inadequate but summarizing statement of such "viewing" is that each human being is a complex unity of distinguishable but organismically interrelated factors dynamically functioning in and with a unique

(30) A ready answer, of course, would be that it is the "soul" which survives death. But from the standpoint of meaning this may be mere substitution of a familiar word. What is meant by "soul" in this context, and what is its relation to personality? The term is used in Scripture in a variety of ways. Some of these are: as mere livingness in the sense of animaline life; as numberable human entities; as an aspect which the person addresses within himself; as the seat of feeling or emotion; as the conscious content of one's mental life; and perhaps still others besides that as the immortal aspect of man. But this is only a return to the question: What is the immortal aspect?

(31) In this context it seems quite proper to say that the human individual by birth is a person and that he then becomes a personality. Thus personality is not something which a person "has", but what he is as the expression of his "personness". Hence, "personality" is not to be limited to a person's social skill or adroitness (i.e. the degree or extent to which a person can get other people to do things), nor is it limited to the most outstanding or strong impression that a person makes in others (e.g. an aggressive personality, or a submissive one, or a fearful one, etc.); "personality" is not limited to anything short of the total activity of the sub-structure called "person."

being; the "unique being" is the "person" which is intellectually distinguishable from but functionally interfused with the coalescence of the distinguishable factors.

It seems to me that a Christian concept of the person is one which recognizes this much about the person with respect to his structure, and which infuses the contents of its Christian beliefs into its interpretations concerning the origin of and explanation for the distinctively human quality of the person, concerning the basic ethical character of his functioning, and concerning the value he embodies.

A final question could thus well be: is a Christian concept of the structure of the person then totally different from a non-Christian one? Though seemingly simple, the question is misleading or at least ambiguous. The catch in it is the word "totally." If this is meant distributively, i.e. in the sense of each-and-every item in it, then the answer is, or ought to be, an obvious NO.(32) If the term is meant collectively, i.e. in the sense of altogether-taken-as-a-whole, then the answer can, or ought to be an equally obvious YES.

(32) As I see it, about the only way this could be answered "yes" is by maintaining that non-Christians never discover or possess any truth whatsoever. Whatever may be said for this in some ultimate sense, the plain existential situation is that such a position sweeps away the ground from underneath the Christian too. Much, if not most, of what the Christian holds to be true in his daily living and in his scientific quests, he takes over from non-Christians. The truth-value of these items per se is not changed by the character of those who discover or hold them, though the relating or explaining of these truth items in ever widening contexts may contain error. But on this latter score the Christian in his daily living and in his scientific quests is also not free from the tincture of possible error.

BRIEF APPRAISALS BY DISCUSSANTS

Rev. E. Alan Richardson:

Dr. Daling here presents a profound and creative piece of research. It was because of their confidence in his scholarship and extensive psychological and theological competence, that the Board of Governors was so bold as to assign a topic of this magnitude to him. One would not ordinarily choose this kind of topic for presentation to a group of this professional stature. But as John Calvin experienced at the hands of Ferrell in Geneva, Dr. Daling had his vocation "laid upon him." He has responded in this significant way. His paper not only will set the tone and frame of reference for the discussions of this conference, but I believe will stimulate further discussion and research in ever widening circles.

My role as a discussant, as I see it, is to examine and to criticize this paper from the theological perspective. It is, however, with a sense of inadequacy that I begin, for the theological implications and issues raised by this paper might well be explored in a paper of comparable size.

As I understand his thought, Dr. Daling is attempting to present a concept of personality which is at once organismic, existential and Christian. It is to these aspects that I direct my comments.

I. The Organismic

Dr. Daling presents an organic, a "wholistic" view of man in the universe. The organismic emphasis in psychology was a reaction against a mechanistic kind of science that seeks to discover reality by dissecting dynamic, living wholes into static fragments and then assumes that the whole is made up of the sum of the fragments. Organismic thought says that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, that reality must be understood contextually, integrally, that the parts derive their meaning and existence from the whole in which they live and move and have their being.

Psychology is then but one perspective by which man can be viewed. In order to be true to itself, psychology recognizes and in some sense incorporates the insights of other perspectives--the sociological, the anthropological, the theological. This is in agreement with the Christian doctrine of God as Creator, which recognizes that this is a universe, not a multiverse, that nature is reliable, that phenomena are interrelated in meaningful pattern, that to touch one aspect of life is in some sense to touch life as a whole.

Man, thus, is an organismic whole. Dr. Daling's insistence on the importance of the "accidens" as well as the "essence" reminds us that Christianity has always insisted that it is not a "spiritual religion" in the sense that it is only interested in the non-material nature of man. Rather Christianity is concerned with the totality of man and the totality of man's relationship to what it is. Rev. Edward Heerema's paper last year on the Biblical concept of "heart" is an excellent expression of this point.

II. Existential

Dr. Daling's analysis of personality is also essential. Existentialism views man as subject, not as object. As one existential psychiatrist, Eric Fromm, expressed it in a recent article in the Saturday Review, "Man Is Not a Thing". Existentialism is part of the phenomenological movement which may be characterized as the plaintive cry of the human spirit against the devastation of the human spirit when it finds itself isolated, mechanized, fragmented. It is an attempt to see life in its "Mystery", its polarity, its paradox. Life can never be contained in a structural form, not even verbally. All definitions of man, in this sense, are self-defeating, since in the very nature of the case to contain man in the boundaries of words is to make static that which is dynamic and to deprive man of his essential vitality.

Existentialism is man affirming himself and the renaissance of "that which is beyond man". Dr. Daling's original question, "What am I?", indicates this dynamic, existential concern. Throughout, Dr. Daling uses words that express movement, wonder, tentativeness. His emphasis on the "core" of personality as the organizing, striving, unifying, responsible aspect of personality, as that aspect which acts as well as reacts, strives beyond itself as well as seeks the status quo, is a sensitive presentation of this existential approach. The "core" concept seems close to what Gordon W. Allport means by "proprium" in his book, Becoming, and also in some sense what Dr. John Plekker and Rev. Elton Holtrop were expressing in their papers last year. The existential analysis is theologically both old and new. The Semitic mind in both Testaments presents man in an existential, organismic pattern. And yet it would not be correct to suggest that the Biblical analysis is all that is involved in modern religious existentialism, for the latter is a child of modern philosophic thought. In its phenomenological aspects, it may be traced to Husserell and Otto. In its contextual aspects, it may be traced through Bergson and Whitehead. The "discovery" of Kierkegaard and the writings of Neo-orthodox theologians have also added to this dimension. Any who attempt an existential analysis of the human situation derive their thought patterns, in part, from these men. On the other hand, this does not necessarily imply that the Biblical analysis is, thereby, violated, for, as has been indicated, the Bible presents a similar approach, though not identical.

III. Christian

The position which Dr. Daling takes, that the extent to which his phenomenological and existential description of man is true, to that extent it is also Christian, is obviously valid. As the early Christian apoleget, Justin Martyr said, "All truth belongs to us Christians". This is not arrogance, but an affirmation that truth from whatever source must be oriented into the Christian Weltanschauung.

In discussing the "specifically Christian" aspects of personality, Dr. Daling discusses Christian ontology. Man was created in the image of God. This is what makes him unique as a human being. Of this Calvin wrote:

"Though the glory of God is displayed in this external form, yet there is no doubt that the proper seat of his image is in the soul. I admit that external form, as it distinguishes us from brutes, also exalts us more nearly to God; nor will I too vehemently contend with any one who would understand by the image of God, that

'...while the mute creation downward bend
Their sight, and to their earthy mother tend,
Man looks aloft, and with erected eyes
Beholds his own hereditary skies.'"

In discussing the imago dei, however, Dr. Daling has a unique analysis. The typology of the image in man takes on a more dynamic character than the more traditional analyses in Christian theology. The emphasis here is upon freedom, creativeness, spirituality and community. In my opinion this does not violate the intention of the earlier formulation of the imago dei and has the advantage of making more dynamic and existential what is perhaps somewhat static and structural.

His contribution to the understanding of human depravity and psychosomatic eschatology are suggestive and deserve wider discussion than this cursory acknowledgment.

If there is any area in which I may express theological criticism of a negative type, it would be in the area of epistemology. As I understand Dr. Daling's position, it is this. There are certain things about personality which may be described phenomenologically and existentially which are knowables. Both the Christian and the non-Christian observer could theoretically describe these phenomena in the same way. When it comes to interpretation and ultimate concern, however, we enter a new level of perception in which we are not dealing with knowables, but with beliefs, with faith.

If this statement is correct, then I feel that it is liable to criticism. There appears to be too sharp a dichotomy between that which can be known by reason and that which must be accepted by faith. On the one hand it should be noted that although their methods of perceiving reality are different, both reason and faith may substantiate their own unique validity. To assume that because revelation is beyond reason it is, therefore, beyond knowledge, is most unreasonable. After all, there are reasons for believing in the validity of revelation. On the other hand, it should be noted that existentially man does not examine phenomena objectively. One main impact of existentialism is to insist that "all perception is apperception". That is to say, what we see is colored by our whole frame of reference, our whole being. That the non-Christian does not "see" what the Christian sees is indicative of that fact. Dr. Daling's inference that the psychologist is less scientific if he permits his belief to color his observation is creating an illusion that that kind of human objectivity is either possible or desirable. To exclude the theological dimension from an existential analysis is only to substitute another theology, however unintended, viz., humanism or materialism.

There seems to be a false antithesis here, as if there were only two epistemological alternatives. Dr. Daling objects to the suggestion that there is such a radical distinction between the Christian and the non-Christian that they have nothing in common and so cannot agree anywhere along the line. I share his objection. His alternative is to build a two-story structure, the first level is the phenomenological where as humans we may observe together phenomena and have no differences. The second level is the interpretative at which level the whole area of faith is dominant. If the two be brought together, it must be by "injecting" one into the other. This seems to me to be too mechanistic a view of epistemology (though perhaps it is just my mechanistic interpretation).

If Calvin is correct when he says that the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves are mutually interdependent and that without the revelation of God in Christ our reason is unable to understand our true nature, then it would appear that the psychologist with a Christian commitment cannot describe man existentially without describing him in some sense theologically.

Perhaps then there is a third position between the two extremes, as I have described them, in which the Christian and the non-Christian can cooperate in the search for truth and yet maintain their distinctive perspectives. I can best describe my suggestion by an analogy. Helen Keller achieved the remarkable ability to communicate and to learn the nature of reality, although she was both blind and deaf. Physically she had the same organs as anyone else, but they were not functioning. "She has eyes but they see not, ears but they hear not". (By way of parenthesis, it must be noted that this physiological analogy is limited in my thinking to this discussion of epistemology and, therefore, soteriological conclusions should not be inferred). Her mode of perception and communication are limited by her own nature and give her a unique perspective. Those with eyes and ears functioning properly approach reality in a different way. So then, the non-Christian psychologist, according to our theology, has an essential deformity which limits his perception of the nature of reality. The Christian psychologist has a fuller awareness of the nature of reality, since he is essentially sound, though the residues of the former deformity are still present and gradually disappearing. As I see it, it is not that the Christian psychologist has a donum superadditum, a superimposed gift, but that he approaches reality from a more sound perspective. In the search for truth both the Christian and the non-Christian psychologist share in common labor and in common humanity (both have the imago dei, though in one is it partially restored and in the other it is still deformed). Each approaches reality from a different perspective. Each has a faith as to the nature of the reality which he describes which is part of his description. In many areas, their perception of phenomena may be in part identical (to pursue the analogy, cold water probably feels the same to Helen Keller as it does to the normal person). Furthermore, and this is an aspect which the Christian is apt to overlook, precisely because of the deformity in nature, we might well expect the non-Christian to have a greater sensitivity to certain aspects of reality than the Christian. Helen Keller developed her sensitivity of touch to a degree far beyond that of the fully-functioning person. In the field of personality studies, for example, it seems doubtful to me that Freud would have arrived at his

psychoanalytic insights if he had been committed to the Christian anthropology that was then prevalent. This would be described theologically as an example of "common grace".

This leads to another matter. If we insist that faith is not unreasonable because it is beyond reason, we must also insist that reason is not unfaithful because it is other than faith. There is a mutuality between faith and reason that must be maintained. They are mutually corrective. Faith adds a dimension of depth to man's epistemological search which unaided reason could not attain. Reason, on the other hand, keeps faith dynamic in that it breaks down static forms in which faith entrenches itself and keeps it existential.

This would mean for me in terms of Dr. Daling's paper that we must not only maintain the unique contributions of both science and theology, but we must also encourage deep-level communication in which the psychological sciences and sharpen, expand and keep existential the structure of Christian theology and in which Christian theology can bring to bear a dimension of depth on the psychological sciences, not only in terms of causality and eschatology, but also existentially.

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Appraisal by M. J. BEUKEMA:

Dr. Daling pointed out to us, that before he wrote his paper there were at least 48 different definitions of personality. In spite of this he dared to defy the psychological world and to add the 49th definition with the expectation that the psychological world would be gracious and tolerant toward him. I, in turn, expect the same toleration from Dr. Daling wherever I seem to call his ideas into question. I expect this because I freely acknowledge that I am not an authority either on the subject of "personality" or that of the "Christian concept of personality."

I find this paper very refreshing because of the humble spirit that prevails in every part of it. Manifestly, a great amount of thought and preparation laid the foundation for this paper and I'm sure it has stimulated everyone of us to thinking on this subject. It should evoke a lively and profitable discussion during this conference.

However, it is not necessary to spend much time in praise of this paper, because its excellent qualities have proclaimed themselves, so I shall direct my appraisal of it to the questions it has aroused in my mind as well as to some of the ideas that are not altogether clear to me or to which I would raise points of difference.

The first obvious thing is that we don't really know what we are talking about. It seems to me that a great deal of difficulty in defining the word "personality" arises because on the one hand we accept or feel that the term personality stands for a definite entity but on the other hand in our search for it we become lost and then seek to build a structure to which we apply the term. It would seem therefore that we should decide first of all to what we will apply the term and then we shall have a common ground for study. Therefore we must decide whether we will assign a meaning to the word personality or whether we are to discover the meaning.

A second difficulty I believe is illustrated by Dr. Daling when early in his paper he states, "The very subject matter itself (i.e. personality) is so indefinitely complex or else so bafflingly simple that it is difficult to pin-point it." Very soon after this he states that his definition "takes into consideration the paradox of tantalizing complexity of personality on the one hand and its baffling simplicity on the other." Doesn't part of the problem rest right here in that we take an "either - or" proposition and change it to a paradoxical one?

With this in mind I would feel that Dr. Daling would do better to reverse the order of his paper to place the section of "beliefs" first in order and then to proceed to the objective findings or knowables. I realize that this places a great deal of importance on the aspect of "beliefs." But isn't that necessary? My impression is that the author tends to minimize "beliefs" when he describes them as being at a different level and that they "may filter" in and that this must be recognized when it occurs. The author points out concerning these beliefs that, "They are beliefs about the origin, nature and destiny of personality." It would seem to me that this indicates that "beliefs" must form a basis upon which research and interpretation must be built. The difference in beliefs between the Christian and non-Christian psychologist then become essential because they may well give rise to very divergent interpretations of any objective findings.

In the development of the subject, the author leads off with the question "What am I?" In answering this question he very well brings out the complex aspect of the paradox to which he referred but he baffles me to find the simple aspect. Also he stresses the "totality of personality" but to me it seems he stresses it to such an extent that he is led to the answer "I am a man." Now that is all satisfactory if we choose to have the term personality comprehend all that is man. But this will not do if we should hold that personality is a part of or an entity within man. My own immature thoughts on this subject at this time incline me to the latter concept. I am inclined this way still further by some of the statements Dr. Daling makes which perhaps I have completely misinterpreted. I refer to his statement, "I am in a real sense the peculiar organization of all the things that have gone, are, and go into into my being. This is followed shortly by, "It appears that I am in just as real a sense also something more than this organization." Another significant statement a paragraph farther on, "The matter was brought in at this point to indicate that the 'organizer' can be actively operative even though he is not consciously intending it, and further that this 'organizer' aspect is 'something more than' or 'other than' the organization even though it is paradoxically interwoven with it." I raise the question to myself, Is not this organizer something an entity? May it not be the person or personality?

I am persuaded still more by the statement, "Personality is the expression of the person, and the person is the unique core imbedded in or rather filterating through a dynamically complex unity of inter-relating physical and psychical elements." This quotation states that "the person is the unique core and to this I would like to agree. But then follows the question, May we not think of a personality inherent in this "person" or "core" and that it works itself outwardly or manifests itself as it manipulates the physical and psychical aspects of the human being in seeking to fulfill God's mandate to serve with the whole being?

It would seem to me that a conception such as this would tie in better with Christian beliefs concerning the origin and destination of man and person; and also in answering the question, What happens to the personality at death?

I believe that we are also confused in our discussions of our subject because we give different shades of meaning to key words we use. I find this in Dr. Daling's paper too and refer to his use of the word "unique" by way of illustration. In the first portion of his paper he refers to the "unique being" and the "unique human being" conveying the impression that the uniqueness is the manifest difference that becomes apparent as the sum total of all the aspects that go into the make-up of this complex being. In the latter portion of his paper he defines this word in a way that gives me a different shade of meaning for it. He states, "There is something about each that makes them as different persons." Then a little farther along he says, "Uniqueness of personality is something in each case created or generated by God in the core aspect....." And then to my mind he seeks to reconcile this with his earlier use of the term by adding "...which is interfused with the entire physical and psychical make-up influenced by heredity and by environment." Isn't it more simple to think that the "core" or "personality", if I may substitute, created with uniqueness by God may manifest itself distinctively in its activities as it works within and through the physical and psychical aspects of his being; which aspects also have their own specific variations?

And now to turn somewhat more to the psychiatric aspect as it relates to this subject, I wonder whether the strong emphasis by a large segment of the psychoanalytic school that psychotherapy should be non-directive is probably an answer or recognition of the inability of one person to change or modify another. The psychiatrist may suggest, may persuade, may help to give insight, may instruct but this is of no avail unless the patient himself will carry through with these, that is, the patient himself must elect or choose to use them. The psychiatrist cannot change the person of his patient and to me this would agree better with the concept that the person is, "this core....(which)....is something constant and rather consistent, though not necessarily fixed," than with the concept that our personality is the sum of many components.

I believe that if we can arrive at a rather clear cut Christian concept of personality as it relates to the totality of man it would be helpful to the psychiatrist in interpreting his observed results of treatments. I believe it would answer some of the controversies that have prevailed. I am thinking of the reaction in the psychiatric world at the time of the advent of shock therapy which is definitely an organic type of treatment. Many psychotherapists became alarmed about it because it upset the theory of their practice of psychotherapy and they refused to believe that good results could be attained with it. However when finally the weight of evidence became too heavy against them, they conceded its usefulness as a possible adjunct if used with psychotherapy. This struggle between the organic and functional schools of thought still persists although the force of the pendulum at the present seems to be in the direction of the organicists.

I am thinking also of the struggle between the clergy and psychiatrists in which the one fears that the other is invading his territory. We as Christian psychiatrists often feel called upon to stress to the minister that our patients are sick and not weak in faith and the minister in turn finds that so often he can help those who have been labeled as "sick" by his use of spiritual teachings and beliefs. An attempt is being made to solve this problem today by agreeing that there is enough room on the front seat of the treatment machine that the pastor can sit beside the psychiatrist.

In my work I prefer to think of the person with whom I am dealing as having a center, or core, or organizer, or personality that is unique as a creation of God and that has been gifted with certain qualities by Him. A mind and body with inherited endowments have been closely united with this core or personality. This person has the role to play in life that he must serve God with all that he has. This personality will shine through or become manifest as it directs and employs the mind and body in this role of service. Then for me death is not a destruction nor a disruption of personality. Sin brought spiritual death to the core and distortion, severe limitations, weakness and sickness to the mind and body. Therefore we may find failure in a person's fulfillment of his role of service due to sin's effects in the personality itself or in the mind or in the body, that is, manifest failure of service may result from disturbance in any one of these three aspects of man alone or in combination. It would seem to me that this would give us the most adequate explanation of the observed results of all the various forms of treatment and would give adequate space in the treatment program for organicists, functionalists, pastors, psychologists, psychiatrists.

I hope I have not sounded too presumptuous in this paper, because these are really fumbings of mine as I grope for knowledge in these matters. I look forward to the papers and discussions still to follow and anticipate more instruction and possibly some conclusive answers from this Conference.

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Appraisal by C. R. YOUNGS:

There are, as Dr. Daling points out, a number of possible approaches to the study of personality, and an even larger number of attempted definitions of that term. This is no mute testimony to the elusive character of the subject for study today by this group. The study of man as man is no recent development, even though modern psychology as a science may be. Man has always been interested in who or what he is, whence he is, and whither he is going.

It may indeed be rightfully expected, and it is indeed so, that the various definitions of human personality are given by their authors in terms of their own deepest philosophical assumptions. In similar fashion the topic given Dr. Daling demands such a basic orientation "Toward a Christian Concept of Personality." Here it is supposed that there is a possibility of a distinctively Christian concept. If study

indicates that this is not so, or is not possible, then this must be stated also.

Perhaps the most common agreement with respect to personality is that it is the reflection in action or behavior of what the individual is in himself. There is no such commonness with respect to what constitutes the personality, its modes of operation, or its powers, innate or acquired. Few would care to deny that there is a Christian personality, or at least persons who are Christian in faith and conduct. The real question is whether there are factors which may be determined by reason or research that belong properly to a Christian concept of personality. This is then the question: Is there a Christian concept of personality - or is there only personality common to all men, and made distinctive in certain men by Christian concepts and beliefs?

It seems to this reviewer that Dr. Daling has gone a long way down the road of saying that "Christian" is a content of man's belief and is nothing constituent in the nature of man. Now if we limit "Christian" to mean the distinct body of revelation concerning Jesus Christ as contained in the Scripture, we must surely agree that this is a matter of faith. But if we may properly envision as Christian all that God has given by way of revelation, then what is distinctively Christian in man is not all a matter of belief or the content of faith. Scripture says that God created man in the Imago Dei. The least form in which this can be stated is that there is in man some image of the Divine Creator. Now research ought to be able to demonstrate that most men everywhere and always have so conceived of themselves - and it has in anthropology done so - and any psychology ought to face the question whence in man this universal concept of his relationship to the divine.

Now it will not do to assign this quest of man to the particular cultus in which he lives. No one will deny that the beliefs of Hinduism or Christianity have a particular effect within and upon the personality of the believer. But all this leaves unexplained the drive within man that seeks God - or at least some God. Paul explains this in Romans 1 when he says that when man will not acknowledge God as God he turns always to the worship of some substitute, very often himself. There is, therefore, at least in man innately, some area of personality that is generically Christian.

Dr. Daling says that the distinctively Christian elements of personality cannot be existentially known nor descriptively arrived at. They are matters of belief. This seems to me, at least, to be quite at variance with his own insistence that the definition of personality be concerned with the total personality. It would almost appear that he is attempting to isolate those factors in human personality that may be ascribed to all men, Christian or not. He states at the outset that he would describe man as he is in his joys and sorrows, and then proceeds to leave out of his account of man in his existential situation one of the most common phenomena of human personality, namely his striving for God.

If we are to move toward a Christian concept of personality we ought not be betrayed into the impasses of discussing mechanisms as mechanisms without content, and of considering what is a total abstraction from the real "existence." For man as he is cannot be abstracted from his beliefs. As a functioning personality his totality enters into every action in some measure. Dr. Daling has given us an excellent description

of the structure of the personality. But I raise the question whether personality dynamics can be in reality divorce from structure. In fact, I believe it to be a good field of study to attempt an analysis of how far process determines structure. We all recognize, and Dr. Daling not the least, that his paper is an abstraction, as any analysis of personality must be. My concern at this point is that, in view of the given topic for discussion, the emphasis might well be other than that chosen for him. It is a valid question where matters concerning man's origin, nature, and destiny fit into a scientific procedure. If we consider for a moment the current emphasis upon human behavior and its control, we are immediately faced with the proposition that we can omit no factors germane to its understanding. This is to say that a study of personality can scarcely be limited to the observation of the manifestation of inner drives, desires and motivations. The study of personality, to be meaningful, must consider the entire man, and cannot be confined to those activities which may be carried on under controlled conditions, or reported by introspection. Because man is a psycho-physical unity in his personality he is related to both the natural and the moral law. His behavior can not be adequately discussed apart from these important factors.

We have said, therefore, that we believe that there are innate factors in personality that are Christian, and are not matters of faith as such. Here we refer to the Imago Dei. We have said further that a truly existential description cannot logically separate between mechanism and content, structure and dynamic, process and belief. Even more so, in speaking of a Christian concept of personality we may not gratuitously omit beliefs - for revelation is of God. And what a man believes existentially affects his action - "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." It is our conviction that Dr. Daling has not sufficiently considered the Imago Dei in relation to human nature as it is, even in men who hate God. Even if we accept Dr. Daling's express limitation of a descriptive purpose in this essay, it is a legitimate question to ask if he has not been too radical in his excision, and too limited in the conception of what belongs in a Christian concept of personality. I realize, of course, that in so short a discussion no adequate statement of personality could be made, Christian or otherwise. Therefore I raise these points as questions to be explored, and not as stigmata.

I am wondering, in this whole attempt to be scientific, if we Christian people have not really thrice compounded confusion. We frequently speak of what is as though it were the normal, and the way God meant it to be. All scientists in the field of psychology have tried to account for the distortions in human nature, for instance, and the explanations are as varied as the definitions of personality. They may not call it sin, but the description is frequently very accurate. It would seem to me that any adequate theory of personality must accurately account for sin. Now when you speak of the innate good and the innate evil in man, even descriptively, you are dealing with matters that revelation speaks more clearly of than man's sin-clouded reason. But my real point is this; the commonality in man, his existential likeness, is due to the fact that all men were created in the image of God, and all men suffer the distortions of sin, although these distortions differ in their effect. Man apart from God, therefore, ought to be viewed as the abnormal. The Christian, on the contrary, begins to approach what human personality

was meant to be.

An existential description that does not include these normative factors can only view man in the commonality of his distorted and perverted image of God. It can only be of limited value in giving us a Christian concept of personality. Our title challenges us to consider what is Christian. To take refuge, as Dr. Daling does, by saying what is true is Christian, is to miss the point and the purpose. True it is, that any accurate description of processes in personality, and any accurate analysis of personality dynamics is Christian because God is truth. But this is scarcely what is meant when we speak of moving toward a Christian conception of personality - it is only a very limited part.

I have very inadequately suggested that in a discussion of a Christian concept of personality we must first discover those components which are innately Christian, that we must further recognize that process structure, and content cannot be existentially separated. Finally, I would plead that a Christian concept begin not with the least common denominator of man as a sinner and therefore deviate from true human personality, but with man as God meant him to be. This is not to devalue scientific procedure - but to put it in its place as a useful tool. While one may perhaps be able to describe human nature accurately, such description fails to answer the "why's" of behavior, and must therefore remain deficient as far as any Christian concept of personality is concerned. This is to say that all personality study is basically meaningless unless man is seen from above - he cannot be adequately explained from within or without, we must look to the total personality who stands in a unique relation to God as creature to Creator and as son to Father. So then human personality as a norm to be achieved, as a functioning reality, yes, even in its deviations, can only be truly understood in Christian terms.

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Appraisal of CORNELIA BRATT:

The purpose of social work is "to help troubled people cope with problems that arise in their relationship to each other and to the world in which they live, problems that frequently stand in the way of productive and satisfying living." "Most of the problems with which social workers deal are the combined product of environmental strain and inner emotional stress, the one interacting upon the other." (1)

"The relationship between the social worker and his troubled client is one of purposeful friendliness, disciplined listening, sympathetic objectivity and planful working together." (2)

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- (1) Social Work as a Profession, p. 3. Pamphlet published by Council on Social Work Education, 1953, 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N.Y.
 - (2) Fruman, Lucy - Better Human Relations, The Challenge of Social Work. Public Affairs pamphlet No. 97A, in cooperation with Council on Social Work Education, p 7; 1956. Public Affairs Pamphlets, 22 E 38th St., New York, N.Y.

I trust that these introductory quotations convey the thought that it is important and basic for a social case worker, in a psychiatric, or any other agency setting, to have an understanding of personality, its development, its motivations, and its interrelationships. This is important in relation to the client and to oneself as the worker. I appreciate Dr. Daling's statement that the definition of personality "should attempt to address itself to personality in its totality."

Social work is a rather new profession. It is only within the last few years that professionally trained people of Reformed persuasion, at least in our geographical area, have entered this field of work. I do not know of any graduate school of social work in the United States, which is specifically based on a Christian philosophy from a Protestant point of view. There are some Catholic Schools where a Master's Degree in Social Work may be obtained.

It was my experience while attending a graduate school of social work that the courses in personality development were chiefly psycho-analytically oriented. Much of this learning I have found useful and applicable in my work with people. Although I benefited from my secular studies of personality and human behavior, I was aware that the philosophy back of it was not Scriptural as to the origin, purpose and destiny of man. It was for this reason that I began attending these conferences, seeking help in arriving at a philosophy of social work based on a Christian understanding of personality development. It is gratifying to see effort put forth to develop a Christian concept of personality by means of this conference as well as those held during the past three years.

The assignment given to Dr. Daling was indeed a large one. I was impressed with the tremendous amount of time, thought and effort which must have gone into its preparation. He has presented a comprehensive and thought-provoking paper. While reading it, I sometimes wished that it had been expressed in less involved terminology.

In the first fourteen pages of his paper, Dr. Daling gives an extensive interpretation of what is included and covered in his definition of, "What Am I." The definition bears repeating. "I am a dynamically complex composite of distinguishable but organismically inter-related factors coalescently functioning in a unique being." The last five or six pages give the Christian concept of personality as the "beliefs about personality," not part of the descriptive knowables of personality.

My first reaction to the paper was, that if one is to present a Christian concept of personality, it is necessary to start with the Scriptural interpretation of the origin, purpose and destiny of man. In other words, that our approach would be distinctly Christian only when starting with the creation of man in the image of God, the loss of this image in part and the concept of the potential of the person to be regenerated through the Holy Spirit, therefore becoming a new creature.

In considering a Christian concept of personality, it appears to me that one is committed to a theological and philosophical point of view by the very use of the term "Christian" in the title. Therefore,

a purely psychological definition with an added statement that the Christian aspects are the "beliefs about personality" does not seem satisfactory to me.

This is my reaction as a Christian Social Worker, not first of all as a Social Worker but as a Christian. This bears out Dr. Daling's comment in his introduction that one's definition of personality has its roots in the "generic religio-philosophical commitments to the totality of reality." Further discussion in this area undoubtedly has been and will be taken up by those in the theological field.

As I continued to study Dr. Daling's paper, I found myself identifying increasingly with the method and content of the presentation. This was so, especially as I tried to relate it in a practical way to my work as a social worker.

Assuming that the description of personality as given in the first part of the paper, under the heading "What Am I", is acceptable to the so called "non-Christian" social worker and also, as far as it goes, to me as a Christian social worker I ask myself these questions.

- (1) Are the methods and techniques I use in working with clients essentially different from those of a non-Christian worker?
- (2) Is my use of the relationship in the interview between the client and myself different?
- (3) Is my understanding of the client in the expression of his problems and conflicts, and the way in which these are related to factors in his heredity and environment essentially different?

I believe the answer must be given in the negative. Is the answer then in the fact that I have an added tool as a Christian worker? That this added tool is based on an awareness of the problems and maladjustments within and between people because of sin, and an awareness of the needs of the client on a vertical as well as horizontal plane?

If this is so, then it would appear that Dr. Daling is correct in thinking of the "specifically Christian" as stemming from a "concern about personality" which is expressed in beliefs about the origin, nature and destiny of man. From this point of view, it appears a Christian social worker is bringing an added tool, a plus something to the case work relationship. If the client then also is a Christian, there is an added potential to work with.

I will not try to discuss the details of Dr. Daling's definition of personality as I realize I am not equipped to do this. However, I wish to raise the following thoughts for possible further discussion.

- (1) The first has been mentioned previously, namely, where should we start in defining a Christian concept of personality, with the origin of man as a unique created being or with the descriptive knowables of personality as Dr. Daling has done?

(2) I would like further discussion on the "core" aspect as discussed under the section dealing with the "unique being" of the person (page 10 and following). What are the similarities and differences between the "core" as used by the writer and the term "ego" as used in psychoanalytic literature?

(3) In relation to the "core" as something that can be acted upon by some source other than its own, examples given are "sanctification, regeneration, hypnotism." (p.12) I believe this is the only place in the paper where regeneration is mentioned. It appears to me that in presenting a Christian concept of personality some more definite place should be given to the work of the Holy Spirit and regeneration.

(4) The social aspects of personality were not very prominent in the paper given. As Dr. Daling states, he has not approached the definition of personality from the developmental point of view. Perhaps in a future conference, consideration could be given to the personality development of the child within the family unit, the meaning of his relationships to parents and siblings, and how these affect adult adjustment. Included in the study might be an evaluation of the various stages of development (infantile, training, oedipal, latency and adolescent) generally described in psychoanalytic literature. Is the Christian concept of this development essentially different?

GROUP DISCUSSIONS

Psychiatrists: J. G. Kingma, Reporter.

In the discussion of the topic, Toward a Christian Concept of Personality, the question arose, What is meant by Christian concept of personality? How does a Christian conception of personality differ from any other? Personality, as the expression of the person in action and in communication may have a Christian or non-Christian character. A Christian view of personality is that only when personality is considered in terms of its essential nature.

This focuses the attention on the personal aspect of man. For the Christian this means that man as person (who develops a personality as an individual in communication with other individuals) has a unique nature. Besides the obvious union of the personality with its psycho-physical being, it has another more mysterious bond with something beyond the knowable organism. It constitutes an essential aspect of man's being, but it eludes our efforts to examine it by means available to us.

This evaluation has significance for any therapeutic endeavor aimed at the individual and the society of which he is a part. There is need for clarification how our view of man is to be reflected in our therapeutic goals. Without losing our identity as psycho-therapists can we recognize and use our identity as Christians? Insofar as we intelligently embrace a growing awareness of these attributes of man, the ultimate destiny of all human striving cannot escape attention in our therapeutic efforts.

A number of those present expressed their appreciation of this attempt by the conference to focus attention on the problem under discussion, and of Dr. Daling for his contribution to our thinking on a difficult and complex subject.

Psychologists: J. A. Split, Reporter.

In the short allotted time for discussion all that can be reported is a digest of truncated questions and remarks that seemed grounded. Some of the comments below are admittedly givens or introductory comments as to the impossible task assigned to the speaker, Dr. Daling.

1. We question so radical an abstraction of the topic under discussion.
2. Can we even consider omitting faith or religious belief in the approach to the problem in the light of our divine origin since faith clarifies man's reason?
3. Can we divorce basic commitments? For example, as Christians we have the commitment through anthropology (God striving or belief system). Do we not have to or are we not forced to deal with or objectify man's strivings - his pursuit of God?

4. The question was raised whether man is innately endowed with personality or whether man's personality is acquired.
5. In merely trying to define this topic, does not this definition preclude arriving at this from a strictly scientific or phenomenological approach?
6. There was some feeling that the emphasis should be the faith and belief as structure though admittedly it can hardly be separated from the content or phenomenological approach.
7. There was agreement with Dr. Daling that man is more than another animal, but we pose "might he not be something of a vacuum that needs to be filled?"
8. Man in the existential sense is not normal, but is abnormal. Therefore, description of sanity may be the point of reference or the starting point. We have to recognize man in the psychological sense as being abnormal. Are we not then in the phenomenological approach describing the abnormal personality?
9. Man is innately endowed and created in the image of God. The acquired is taken to be the imperfect development or failure to develop because of the effect of sin in the environment.

* * * * *

Educators - D. F. Tweedie, Reporter

This group had personnel from a wide educational range, i.e., Christian secondary, Bible Institute, Christian College, and Theological Seminary. The paper by Dr. Daling was discussed from the perspective of its implication and application for student counseling.

The paper was deemed a very fine attempt at analysis of personality structure, though ostensibly rather distant from the actual school situation. It was agreed, however, that such a theoretical approach may well be the prerequisite to adequate student counseling and teaching relations. The essentially intuitive evaluation of personal problems seems to limit the value of a detailed essay on personality structure.

The discussion of the paper itself centered around two problems:

1. The concept of "homeostasis". It was generally agreed that, if the paper presented this as a basis for motivation understood in its historical, biological context, then the purview of the concept is rather limited. If, however, it has a "spiritual" reference to the imbalance of personality without God, then it might be very descriptive from a Christian perspective.

2. It was felt that much of the open discussion of the paper was of dubious pertinence, due either to the oversight of the author's distinction between "a Christian concept of personality" and "a concept of Christian personality" or to the rejecting of such a distinction.

From the Educator's corner, there was a unanimity of opinion that further research and discussion in the area of personality dynamics would be very valuable and more clearly pertinent to the field of counseling in at least two areas:

1. The understanding of student motivation, or lack of motivation, in academic pursuits, and
2. The relationship of personality defect and/or sinful perversity in deviant behavior.

In conclusion, a vote of appreciation was voiced to Dr. Daling for his fine presentation of such a difficult theme.

* * * * *

Pastors - R. Heynen, Reporter.

In any discussion of a Christian personality the subject of regeneration and the work of the Holy Spirit in man must be taken into account. It is not correct to say that an unregenerate person is not a whole person, or an incomplete personality. But in the personality of the Christian the work of God in man involves a radical change in the inner forces of man's life. The result of this is expressed in thinking, willing, feeling and actions. All of these will be motivated by the regenerate self, and hence exert a profound influence upon our entire view of Christian personality.

REFLECTIONS

by

J. T. Daling

In reply to the Discussants and Reporters.

The following are not intended to be point by point refutations or rebuttals to the various criticisms made of this paper at the time of the Conference, but only as sketchy clarifications of possible misunderstandings.

The fact that "sin" was not given greater prominence in this treatment stems from the approach to the problem: the emphasis was on the structural aspect of the person, not the dynamic; the focal point was on "What am I" creationally considered and analytically discerned, not on "Who am I" theologically considered and ethically evaluated. How I behave and why I do so, are unquestionably essential and necessary phases of the assigned topic. The only apology needed for their omission is that such stems from the limiting of the really large topic to that of "structure" or make-up. Hence, the criticism given that this paper deals with an aspect which is an "abstraction", is a valid one. But it should be added that a treatment of the "who", or the "how", or the "why" of the person or personality independent of the "what", would also be abstractions" (even though they might seem more concrete and more appealing for discussion.) An adequate treatment of the assigned topic requires that no significant phase be ignored. But such demands a book rather than a paper.

The second observation is that the order of treatment of the main topics should not be taken too seriously. The main concepts of "organic unity," "human being," "person," and "Christian beliefs" could as well have been treated in any other order. The fact that the topic of "Christian beliefs" was treated last does not mean that these beliefs enter logically or existentially as tag-ends or afterthoughts in the Christian concept. Actually these beliefs are present at the very outset and active throughout the antecedent treatment, but isolating and explicating them was delayed for later treatment.

A final observation is more a matter of general methodology. As such it is in a sense both extra-psychological and extra-theological; it can perhaps best be designated as epistemological in character. It has to do with the knowing aspect of the person. It has become a much bandied topic in certain Christian circles in recent years whether man as man really knows or whether what he knows is real (i.e. is true). It would be both futile and arrogant to assume that one could dissipate this "problem" with a few sketchy remarks. But the following seem to me to be highly relevant. For one thing, it seems to me to make a great difference whether one implicitly or explicitly in the discussion of man proceeds in the order of only sin and grace or of creation, sin and grace. Again it also makes a great difference if one takes seriously the "Imago Dei" as constitutive of the individual's human nature. Nor is it at all inconsequential or tangential that it is the Second Person who is the Creator and that it is He as the true Light "which lighteth every man

that cometh into the world" (even though men did not recognize Him as the Light). And finally that as Scripture itself enjoins us, we do well to keep matters of faith as matters of faith ("These things are written that ye may believe", "It is by faith that we believe that ..."). Christian beliefs are not strictly speaking rationally acquired nor are they rationally demonstrable, though they can be made reasonable to those who believe them. In short, what we accept by faith we know by faith and must keep on believing, and what we believe by faith we believe to be eternally true. Matters of human knowledge are of quite a different character; these are or become known by rational means which root in Divine-like capacities that man as human creature was endowed with creationally, and because man is essentially finite as well as now also sinner his rational knowledge is likely at best to be fragmentary (the Christian's no less so) and always subject to revision and/or extension. This holds also with respect to a Christian concept of person and/or personality: what we know about it by rational means is the product of finite human endeavor, what we believe concerning it by faith is a Divine gift.

One of the critics raised a question concerning the "change" wrought by "regeneration", "sanctification", and "hypnosis." Perhaps few if any will doubt that the person or personality can be changed by these and still other means. But it is a rather sticky matter to state precisely what changes. The following suggestions, with respect to the psychological aspects, are tentative.

It will no doubt be granted that at best "hypnosis" does not change one structure of the person nor even the basic pattern of his dynamics but only his personality and then only certain aspects of it which are somewhat readily accessible to voluntary control (be it through the medium of another). But even with respect to these aspects there isn't necessarily any root re-direction in ethical motivation.

In the case of "sanctification" it is likewise questionable whether the person himself effects any change in the structural or compositional make-up of his being. It is even questionable whether, in a certain sense at least, he even changes the basic pattern of his dynamics. In fact, in lots of ways even his personality doesn't change: the bad-tempered person and the jovially disposed person retains each his basic temperament. Yet, unquestionably the person (whether jovial, moody, bad-tempered, etc.) earnestly and actively engaged in the life-long process of sanctifying himself is actually changing something with respect to and in himself. And this is perhaps best summarized by saying that operating within the givens of his personness (including re-birth), he is continually (though not necessarily continuously) attempting to mold his inner and outer doings to conform to a standard not his own - for the Christian this means struggling to live, to exercise oneself, in the way God wants him to (i.e. infusing the heavenly principle of love or rather the gift and dynamic of heavenly love into his earthly existence). Thus in some sense, and a real one, "sanctification" subjectively considered does change personality with respect to the manner and purpose of at least some of its manifestations.

From the psychological standpoint the problem becomes more vexing with respect to what kind of changes are brought about by "regeneration."

That this effects a radical change is incontestible; in fact it is such a pervasive and penetrative root change that, so we believe, it takes a specific act of God to initiate it. But what is changed? The personality or the person? Or both? And in what way? It seems to me that regeneration does not change the structural aspects of the person. The person gets no new capacities, nor are the existing capacities as capacities necessarily extended (e.g. the person's intellectual penetrative power or imaginative reach is not increased by "re-birth" - note well, this is not a matter of what God can do in "re-birth" but of what He does in so far as humans can discern it - although some capacities may become exercised more often (e.g. forgiving and sympathizing). The person retains the same capacities and even his basic personality traits. God does not deny or obliterate the creational aspects of what makes the individual a human being, nor does He erase the complex of personality features and factors which makes each the unique human being that he is (e.g. the person's memories and "unconscious content" are not blotted out, nor his personality traits removed: Peter remains the temperamental one, John the gentle one, Thomas the inquisitive one, etc.). But God does bring about a roote change in the DYNAMICS of the person.

In "regeneration" the root change is essentially the intrusion of ethical re-direction in man's strivings a revolution is effected in man's inner being which makes it possible for the God-like capacities to be exercisable again in God-like ways. The "seed" of the originally, or primordially created dynamic is "re-inserted" in the creationally given structure of the person. In a real sense the capacities do not change but a profound re-orientation has been introduced in the person's dynamics (in the fountain heads of his motivations) so that the exercise of these capacities can be changed with respect to quality and goal, and thus to some extent also with their conscious content.

The word "can" is used advisedly. The regenerated individual does not always and inevitably direct his strivings in Godly ways. The in-born tendency to distort God-intended purposes is still present in his being not merely statically but actively. There is still the temptation (and at least at times the succumbing) to make himself or something designated by him the God-surrogate. But the change wrought deep within his being, by a power not his own, now wants him to be truly God-like in the way and the ways he functions. He no longer considers himself or any other thing to be the source of his inner power, instead he innerly acknowledges this source to be God. He now accepts his finitude in the light of and in relation to Divine infinitude.

The extent to which the individual effectuates this radical change of "regeneration" in his dynamics through his own "sanctification" will be the extent to which he changes his person not structurally but functionally and thus to that extent also change his personality.

RELIGION AND MEDICAL EDUCATION *

by
Granger Westberg

Introduction by Rev. Richardson:

It is with distinct pleasure that I introduce a professor of mine at the University of Chicago, Dr. Granger Westberg.

Dr. Westberg has had a significant career in the field of hospital chaplaincy and now holds a joint professorship in both the medical and in the divinity school of the University of Chicago, as Associate Professor of Religion and Health. This is a tremendous task as you may well infer. Not only to be an authority in theological discipline but also to relate the theological discipline to the medical discipline and channel these to the total health of the patient. I sometimes feel that we tend to overcomplicate something which is not nearly so complicated in terms of the welfare of the patient. Perhaps an illustration might be of help in introducing Dr. Westberg. It is regarding a young boy who appeared to be quite normal at first, but as he matured and first began to speak it was noticed that he had a nasal twang, something like this (illustrated vocally) and as he matured he could never get rid of his nasal twang. When he was about six they took him to see a doctor who examined him and could find nothing wrong physically. This was no comfort to the boy who continued to have this strange nasal sound. As he went through high school, girls would not go with him because of this affliction, and finally he went to a counselor who took his history, and inquired as to his emotional problems, and finally he said, "Have you ever tried blowing your nose?" And the young boy did and he was all right after that.

Address by Dr. Westberg:

That's a very good story. I am particularly pleased to be introduced by Allan Richardson because he's one of the sharpest student's I've had in a long time and one of the things that he has succeeded in doing is crashing medical school and getting into medical classes which has been "verbotten" until now. In fact he got into class without the professor knowing he was there. It was a class in psychiatry. Then he asked a question - he contained himself just so long. The professor said, "The way to answer that question is to read such and such an article in such and such a medical journal. And Allan's face fell. He wondered what he could do about it now. So he came to me and asked what he should do. I said, "Go ahead and read the article - you can read - see what happens." The final result, as I got it from the medical students that were in the classroom and all of whom knew that he wasn't a medical student but a theological graduate student, they said the report was the best report they had had all year. It was done with exceptional ability; there was nothing wrong with the whole report except that he mispronounced one medical term - outside of that mistake the whole report was perfect. The class applauded when he finished the report - which is not done in a normal class situation. The professor was amazed

* Tape recorded and transcribed.

to find that this student who did so well in medical field was a clergyman. This broke the ice for us and we are in the midst of breaking this ice and Allan is one of those who is doing an exceptional job for us. He is now enrolled properly for this quarter and we think this can be the beginning of some close relationship that we have not been able to have up to now.

I would like tonight to use as the statement that I am going to make, a statement which I made to the Deans of Medical Colleges at their annual convention at Colorado Springs in November. The reason I would like to make use of this same presentation is that I would like you to know what people in theology or religion are saying to people in medicine. Then the fact that this was acceptable to the medical deans and the fact that they are now willing to discuss this, as you listen to what I said to them, you can also feel that they were not against this and generally were willing to accept the principles involved. Now, in the last few weeks the result of this has been that a few Deans of these schools have asked if we could spend a day to three days on their campuses. One of them put it this way, "I don't want you to get the idea that we are really interested in religion at this school, but every doctor has to deal with some of it and I happen to think it is something that the boys should all get a little of." He kept stressing "a little of." He continued, "I talked to the medical faculty and asked them if they would mind having you in as sort of a hit-and-run professor. That is, you tell them a little bit about it and then you get out of here quick." This seems to be the mood that medical schools are in today. They are interested in a little bit of this provided you do not stay around and take away any of their time from the curriculum, because each of them, as you know, is fighting for his life to have enough time for surgery and enough time for medicine, and now psychiatry is coming in and taking more time than they think it should.

Now if religion says, "We want some time for religion and medicine," they really are going to explode. We are in the very early stages of getting the approval of the Deans and hope that their faculty members will gradually see some merit in some parts of this. What I said to the Deans was, "During the past ten or fifteen years some rather unexpected things have happened in the relationship between medicine and religion. Ministers and physicians who previously have had only a speaking acquaintance are now discovering that they have quite a bit in common, the patient. And so they are now beginning to converse on a professional level. We cannot at this time trace the history of that change to show the many events of the past fifty years which contributed materially to it. Suffice it to say that there has been a growing interest in the patient as a person, a whole person, with physical, mental, and spiritual needs which somehow do not respond to piecemeal treatment.

A great many physicians seeing the needs of the whole person are seeking new ways to minister more effectively to all of these needs. The clergyman also has begun to see that there is more to his job than merely preaching sermons. He knows that only about ten percent of his week is spent preparing lectures and sermons. He has come to see that his theological education has not prepared him adequately for the ninety percent of his week which is spent primarily in working personally with individuals. He knows that he cannot remain aloof to personal problems or handle them with platitudes. His parishioners demand that he get down out of his

pulpit and work with them and their problems down where they are.

This demand that religion be made relevant to life has shaken the foundations of theological education. Within a short span of years many seminaries in the United States have added a chair in Pastoral Care which is one way of describing the pastors ministry to the individual. More than that, because it has been demonstrated that pastoral care can best be sought by the clinical method, seminaries which long enjoyed a picturesque location high on a hill outside the city walls have suddenly realized precisely that this is where they should not be. At this moment a number of seminaries are discussing how to move into the centers of cities close to laboratories, such as medical centers, social agencies, industrial plants, community houses, colleges etc. which will provide students with clinical material. In this way students will be able to test the validity of religious faith in actual contact with fellow humans in crisis situations.

It is no secret that theological educators are indebted to medical education for demonstrating how theory may be made relevant to practice by daily moving back and forth between classroom and clinic. We are experimenting with this at Chicago because we have the Divinity School and the Medical School about 300 feet apart and yet for all practical purposes during these many years that they have been that close they could just as well have been 300 miles apart. There was no communication whatsoever between the two faculties, they didn't know each other. Now because our Chancellor has been stressing the fact that we really ought to call many of our universities "multiversities" he thinks we ought to do all that we can to begin to unify what is going on on a university campus, and to see if the faculties of the separate colleges and schools, which for so long have been satisfied with themselves as they are, would now begin to get acquainted and to realize what this back and forth conversation is exceedingly helpful to all of us.

With this in mind we have suggested that our students (we've been experimenting with a small group of students who spend approximately all of their mornings in the divinity school classrooms, their afternoons in the clinics where they meet the living human documents, people who are asking the basic questions of life, "why has this happened to me", "what is this all about", "what is the meaning of life anyway") that our students deal with the people who are asking these questions because these are the questions with which theology has always concerned itself. The students' evenings are spent in the library, the late evening and the typical bull sessions are held in the dormitories where they sort of pull everything together. And the hope is that by the next morning, when they come back to divinity school classes, the questions they will have to ask of the theological professors will be real ones because they are acting in the role of pastors, and the people who are turning to them for help are saying, "Pastor, what shall I do about this?", "Pastor, what is the meaning of Christ's life and death for me in this situation?", "How does this all affect me now?", etc. And the professor will find, as some have told me, that these students who are closely involved in the clinical process seem to be asking the most pertinent questions. Theological education, we think, should not be carried on apart from the actual practice of the work of the pastor.

In addition to this, theologians, recognizing that they never minister to a soul apart from a body, have invited physicians in the last five or ten years to participate in the instruction of theological students. We are convinced that such teaching by mental science has enriched our theological curriculum. In our specialized courses these doctors have an hour to two hours in which they are free to describe their particular field which will be of some value to our ministers. We have found these doctors to be exceedingly helpful in the total process of getting men ready for a ministry which always involves something of the physical. But it is at this point that we must speak frankly to medical education. As we in theology have been working more closely with physicians on a professional level and have included them on our faculties and in frequent discussion groups we have discovered that just as clergymen have blind spots in regard to physical and psychological needs of people, so physicians have blind spots in terms of the philosophical or theological dimensions of the lives of their patients. So obvious has this become that we must select physicians who lecture to theological students with the greatest care, lest the students lose respect for them and dub them, as they have in some cases, "mechanics". Now that theological schools profit by the presence of matured physicians in their classrooms and clinics, could it be that medical students might profit from having a qualified clergyman related in some way to their educational program? If so, how could this be begun and what would be the content of such teaching?

In simplest outline form the steps might be something like the following: a) begin the program by appointing a clinically trained chaplain to the medical center or hospital used by the medical school. Chaplains who are approved by the American Protestant Hospital Association have had four years of college, three or four years of seminary, two to five years in a parish, followed by approximately two years residency in a designated clinical training center. b) As the Chaplain develops teamwork relationship with individual physicians, they will gradually use him in informal discussions with medical students on the wards. c) Encourage the chaplain to have joint seminars on religion and medicine in which cases of mutual interest are presented. d) When after a year or two the medical faculty is assured of the quality of the chaplain's work he might be invited to participate in some of the courses. He may also become an instructor, give a series of lectures, or lead discussion seminars in a more structured setting.

Now the subjects of joint interest to religion and medicine are too numerous to discuss here in any other way than just to list them and maybe say a word or two about three or four. I will mention about a dozen.

The first subject we think the medical student should know something about is the role of the parish pastor in the hospital. This includes actual case presentations, describing vividly how clergymen of various faiths go about their work and also at what points the physicians might assist them. The doctor would like to know what goes on behind closed doors when the minister goes in to see his patient. He assumes, whenever we have questioned some of the doctors as to what they think goes on, that the minister chats with the patient and upon leaving he reads Scripture and has a prayer, and this is it. This may be true in many of the calls that are made. But more and more we are finding that pastors can do much more than that, that the Scripture and the prayer are just a part and these grow out of the conversation which has gone on for fifteen,

twenty minutes or maybe longer. The whole conversation could be described as a period of prayer. It is all conducted in the movement that takes place when prayer is a part of the total concern of both. We certainly feel that at least with our students, that if a student talks about the weather, about golf, and church organizations, and then suddenly stops and says, "I would like to have a prayer, and read some Scripture for you", as if to say "I haven't been a minister to you up to this point, I've only been a friendly neighbor, now I will become a minister and go into a priestly act", the visit is not as meaningful as it could be. The whole visit should be priestly or pastoral in nature. We are finding that there is less and less "chit chat" carried on by our student pastors and more and more heart to heart talking on a deep level which is what we think ought to happen on a pastoral call.

A second thing we think a medical student ought to know something about is the unique aspects of the hospital chaplain's role as he works in a special way both with medical personnel and with parish clergy, trying in a sense to be a catalyst who brings them together and shows how the two can work together.

The third area has to do with a brief history of the relationship of religion and medicine in both Christian and non-Christian culture.

Fourth - the art of professional conversation with normal individuals who are under stress. This discussion would draw on the resources both of Christian pastoral care through the centuries and the modern insights based on newer psychological discoveries. A method of presenting this material will include recorded interviews studied with reference to religious concepts which color human behavior. We have found that while in our classes (you who are pastors I am sure recall that when you and I took classes in pastoral theology now called Pastoral Care) often the course consisted of a fine pastor who had been in the parish for a number of years recalling experiences he had when he was a pastor. And I recall a man, a grand old man, who it seemed in every third sentence started with, "When I was in Omaha, this is the way I did it," and then another little story or two, "Now when I was in Omaha" and it seemed as though we were living with him in Omaha. I was in Omaha last week and I had to smile because whenever I am in this city I think of our course in Pastoral Care.

Now we are trying to find ways, and we are not very successful yet, but we are beginning to find ways of describing what goes on in a pastoral call. And one way is to have the student write up in detail what he said when he was talking with the patient. It is surprising how much he can remember of a verbatim nature of the conversation. Other ways include a "role-playing" situation where the instructor plays the role of a patient who has a problem. You send two of the students out of the room, taking a third one in the room and let him carry on a conversation with this patient as he would do it if he were the pastor calling on an actual patient. We tape-recorded this so we can talk about this later. When he finishes and the class has heard it, we call in one of the students we sent out of the room. But I am still the same patient with the same problem. And now we see how a second man approaches this patient. And when he finishes, the third man. Then we play back this recording, showing how three different men, three different Christian pastors, approach the same basic problem. And it is fascinating to listen and watch how each man uses his own unique ways of coming at a problem - and say all three

are successful in helping this man - they will all do it in slightly different ways. But in other cases, in many cases, we find that one is not helpful at all. He is just hindering the process of growth in this man; another is preaching a sermon at this fellow because he never learned that you have to be a different person when you get out from behind the pulpit than you are when you are standing in the pulpit. You cannot be a preacher in this counseling situation. We learn most by the mistakes a man makes and we are grateful when they make plenty of them just for the sake of showing what should not be done. They usually accommodate us.

The fifth area has to do with what the medical student should know what the church is saying about sex education and the family, or the doctor's role in such educational programs with youth groups and married couples clubs on a community wide scale. The church is finally getting to the point where it is willing to discuss the whole field of sex education. We are convinced now that the best time to give sex education is when children are very young, when they begin to ask questions about it and this begins about the age of three and a half. Well, we cannot give a lecture to a group of children of three and a half, so the next best thing, and we think it is the "best way", is for the pastor and the doctor to talk with couples who have children in the early ages, and help these couples through couples' clubs to learn that the church approves of this kind of openness and honesty as we deal with children. And we start with the basic questions that children ask, "Where did I come from?", which children want to know. It is the parent's responsibility to answer these questions easily without any ostentation, without getting excited, just answering the questions in the same way he would answer a child's question, "What are we going to have for supper tonight?". This is not easy and we do not expect parents to get this overnight. One of the ways this can be helped is for them to be in a group with other couples where they can try their wings, as it were, and see how they do it and hear how other parents are doing it, hearing what other children are asking and how these parents have handled these questions. When a pastor is present, and a doctor, then you see they gradually begin to see that this is a subject you can talk about; you don't have to hide this subject under the table. It is one of many subjects that children are going to be interested in and it certainly should not be given more prestige or more interest by saying nothing about it which is what the church has done with sex. It has made it much more important because it has kept its mouth shut as if there was something wrong with it.

The sixth area has to do with the role of the physician in the premarital counsel, developing the theme of physical, emotional and spiritual factors in the marriage relationship. The church's new interest in this field is significant because of its previous mishandling of the subject and its need now for a joint approach with medicine. I remember when I became a hospital chaplain I received a telephone call from a pastor who asked, "Can you give me the name of a doctor who will talk to a couple I am going to marry in the next week or two?". I said, "I will call you back right after lunch." So I went down to the doctor's dining room and sat with seven or eight at the table and asked, "Which one of you fellows would like to talk to a couple who are about to get married?" They became very silent and quiet until one said, "About what?". "Well, about what a doctor ought to talk to a couple about when they are planning to get married." This started quite a discussion. We kept kicking this problem around and I kept needling them by saying, "Well,

you fellows have a responsibility here, after all every couple has to go to a doctor to have a pre-marital examination, what do you do with them?" Their general answer was, "The nurse takes care of that. She just takes the needed examinations, that's it." Don't you talk to the couple at all?" One answered, "Yes, I give pre-marital counseling. I tell them to take it easy and be careful." This was about the limit and I know that I interviewed about one hundred doctors and found that not one was doing anything significant in the field of pre-marital counseling. Then it began to dawn on me, that if you were to do anything significant with a couple you need a good hour to sit down with them. You need to have a relaxed setting, not a doctor's office with twenty-five people in the waiting room. It is just impractical to expect the doctor to do this in his regular office hours.

Also, our experience as pastors is that when you talk to a couple, only two people together, and give pre-marital counseling, it is a rather difficult situation because they may be rather reticent people, not use to talking about these things, except in a general way, not even what the pastor might talk about such as the marriage ceremony, meaning of the service of worship, the background of the couple's interest in religious things, their desire and plans for setting up a Christian home, etc. Even these things often find the minister doing ninety percent of the talking. How do you break this down? Well, we worked out a little questionnaire which forces the couple involved to talk a little more. But, better still, we find it useful to have more than one couple present. Say if you have three couples or six couples, then you get the give and take that takes place in a discussion in a group - you have group dynamics in operation.

So after three years or so of talking about it, the medical staff and the chaplain's department set up a pre-marital conference once a month, which is still going on the second Monday of every month, to which as many as ten to a hundred people come. A hundred is too many, but during May that's when we get one hundred. The best group is, I think, two to three dozen. Now this is a two hour session and the reason I am elaborating this a bit is because I would like to hope that you men, doctors and clergymen, would see what you could do about setting up a marriage clinic in the communities that you come from. It could be in your church, it could be in your hospital, in a YMCA or some centrally located building. The best reaction we got from it was the kind where couples would say a year later, "We do not remember the many details of what went on that night but most of all we remember that one stood up in front of a mixed group and discussed a subject which up to that time had been quite taboo in our time; and to think that this could be discussed freely, openly, without any embarrassment and yet going into the greatest detail made us feel that apparently God had made our bodies like he made everything else and this was holy and wonderful and we could now discuss it together."

I remember one couple saying that it was the beginning of conversations they had never had before. It started conversations with their in-laws to be so that for the first time the girl could talk to her father and mother and the boy to his father and mother. They began to see that this was one of many subjects of interest to a couple about to be married - one that certainly ought to be discussed.

So this is all we hope to accomplish. To make couples feel that it is all right to discuss these things and that it isn't something that you do not discuss. I think you would be interested in this story. I was talking in an old people's home one night and for some reason the man who introduced me mentioned that we had a marriage clinic. Well, I did not speak on that subject to the group but after the talk we had a coffee hour and a group of little old ladies over 80 gathered around me and one said, "We would like to know more about that marriage clinic that you have." I could not imagine what they would want to know about a marriage clinic so I asked, "What would you like to know about it?" "We would like to know what you tell those young people today." I answered, "We tell them we believe the physical side of marriage has been ordained by God, that it is normal, that it is natural, and that it is very enjoyable." One little lady said, "Oh my, I wish they had told us that it was to be enjoyable. You know, when we grew up and got married, we were never supposed to enjoy that part of marriage. And if you did you didn't tell your closest girlfriend because she would think you were like a prostitute."

By our silence, as a church, we have given this impression and it is unfortunate. Now let's get that taken care of as quickly as we can and I am sure we can do so with real dispatch.

The seventh area has to do with functional illness as it is related to attitudinal factors which are often intertwined with religious concepts. This whole matter of psycho-somatic medicine. We hear of it a lot. Everytime I have talked to a group of general practitioners they have said, "Boy, could we use a minister in our clinic." One of them said, "Could I use one today! Every other patient that came in my office needed a minister rather than a doctor." Another doctor chimed in, "Well, I would say that seventy-five percent of my patients need a minister." We hear this all the time and wonder what will we do about it. After they have seen the doctor about a half a dozen times and he is not sure what to do, then they come knocking on our door and so we get the same people that you doctors get and we don't know what to do with them. We had better find out how we can work this thing together. The only way to do it is work at it, team up together and help these people who at least could be helped a little bit.

The eighth area has to do with faith healing, its philosophy, its exponents, its problems, and relationship or lack of relationship to the churches. Whenever I go into a part of the country where Earl Roberts and his TV show is on the air, we get some real reactions from pastors who say that this is really difficult to handle. As a church, or churches, we have said almost nothing officially about faith healing and I think we cannot say anything about it until we develop fine groups of clergy and physicians who are going to do a scholarly piece of work in investigating what the church has said and is saying today, and what it should say, and how this is related to the field of medicine, and how it is related to Christian Science and all the rest. But we have no definitive statement on what the church is saying about faith healing. The doctors would like to know; the ministers would like to know too.

The ninth area has to do with a broad area of morals and medicine. This has special reference to the problem of birth control, sterilization, artificial insemination, eugenics, abortion, euthanasia, etc. What does the church say, for instance, about birth control. Have you in your church

had a conference on birth control, when you had your couples' club? Have you explained what your church's position is on it? Or are they still in the dark? Where do they get their information on birth control? From the Readers Digest, I would say. This is where most people learn about these things. Maybe the church ought to discuss these articles from the Readers Digest and from the Ladies Home Journal with the pastor and the doctor present to see where we stand on these things. I happen to be a Lutheran. Until recently we said nothing about birth control. Finally we have come out of our shell and begun to say that, "Yes, we believe in birth control, only we call it responsible parenthood." We believe that parents ought to be responsible for every child they bring into the world, and we stress the fact that marriage is for the purpose of having a family if at all possible. But shall we encourage couples to have children today, that is around the campus? Incidentally, you know we don't have that problem today although we did have it when I entered the ministry eighteen years ago; we had to; my job seemed to be to encourage a couple to have a child or two if they could. At least at the University of Chicago, our job is to discourage couples who live in one or two room prefabs. So to encourage young couples isn't our problem any longer.

Now, what do we say about birth control? We say there are four conditions under which birth control methods seem to make pretty good sense. First, is for a period of adjustment; we think that a couple should have an opportunity, if they haven't been together very long, not courting very long and not engaged very long, they might like a year or a year and a half without the responsibility of children so that they can become better acquainted. So we suggest that they have a period for adjustment, but the adjustment period should not go on into two, three or four years; they should start their families as soon as possible. The second condition under which we feel birth control methods make sense is when we are thinking in terms of spacing children. In our clinic for mothers lying-in-hospitals, I have talked with Catholic mothers a great deal as well as Protestant and Jewish mothers, and I have talked to many Catholic mothers who have a child every strawberry season, but you cannot tell me that they are really pleased about this. Afterwards they say, "Yes, I know that we are supposed to have children this often but I certainly would like to have a chance to catch my breath between children." So we say, from a Protestant point of view, there ought to be a space between children so that the mother is ready for the coming of the next child. The third reason for birth control would have to do with health or economic reasons, and where these are valid it would make good sense. For the health of the mother or father may require not to have a child at that particular time. The fourth reason would be for a limitation of the size of a family. Suppose you have a couple who would get married at the age of 23 and by the age of 33 they now have a family of four children and this is the size family they would like to have. Certainly they shouldn't have to go on having more children just because they want to be together as man and wife. Now the Catholic church says that intercourse is only for the purpose of procreation, especially that. We can't quite see that because we have a feeling, now that we found modern medical means of birth control which are not harmful in any way, to the patient or to the person, this is the same thing as with penicillin. You certainly would not say "I won't use penicillin, I'm against it." Fifty years ago we did not have the modern medical methods of birth control which were not harmful, so we had to oppose it then. But today the methods are not harmful. Therefore the church can say it is perfectly all right. It seems to be a tragedy to keep this couple, who now have four children and cannot afford economically

and for other reasons to have more, apart as man and wife. After all, we are the only of God's creatures who are made in such a way that we face each other in the act of intercourse so that there is a deepening of our relationship to one another. This is a spiritual experience, not just a bodily experience. This is a deepening experience between two people and to say that this must be stopped at the age of thirty-three just because you do not want any more children would seem to us to be a very wrong thing to do. And so we encourage the use of birth control methods after the age of 33 and after the number of children has been reached that they desire in order that they may continue to deepen their spiritual relationship through physical relations.

The kinds and the methods of birth control we approve of as a church, well, I am not just speaking as a Lutheran but as a representative of many Protestant denominations, so that in a sense this is the Protestant position; correct me later if you will. The two methods we approve of are modern medical means - contraceptives of one kind or another. The second method would be rhythm. We encourage the use of rhythm, if the couple does not mind if it doesn't always work, because it doesn't. If the couple doesn't mind having another child, rhythm is a method they might enjoy using. These are the two that are generally approved. The third method, which is the Roman Catholic method, we definitely disapprove of. This is the method called total abstinence. We know it always works and know we never have to worry about having more children, but we think it is contrary to the intimacy that ought to be continued in the marriage state. Have you said this to your people if it is what you believe? Do they know where you stand in the matter of birth control? Or do they have to get it sort of negatively from what the Catholics believe, and then say "We don't believe that"? We are always protesting against the Catholics. Let us give them what we believe to be the positive approach.

The tenth area has to do with the handling of grief as related to terminal illness. The doctor is dealing with grief situations all the time. And the doctor certainly ought to know what the Bible has to say about grief through the years, what the Old Testament has to say about it, how pastors and rabbis have handled grief through the years. Pastors need to know what some of the new discoveries, rules or laws of psychiatry are which are related to the ancient laws of the Hebrew-Christian culture and heritage. Eric Lindeman has enunciated these quite well as he talks about the grief that everyone needs to go through in order to come through this experience as a whole person.

The eleventh area has to do with when to call a minister or priest or rabbi and when not to call a clergyman. Now you can figure out what this one is. This is a discussion of when the physician may be of more help religiously than the clergyman. Here is where our doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers comes in, that every Christian has a responsibility. First of all, he is his own priest. Secondly, he is also a pastor to others, and therefore he must be a minister to other people so that the man who is a doctor should not say, "Well, I'm a doctor, I can't be involved in this." The minister must never be jealous of any prerogative in this field. This is a field where all of us as Christians are concerned about our fellows. Therefore, there are many times, as I am sure this conference has brought up, the idea that when people are talking to their doctor in a one-to-one relationship that is as deep as any relationship between a pastor and a parishioner, that the doctor would certainly be doing the wrong thing to say, "Now I can't talk

to you about this, this is religion, you will have to talk to a minister about this." No, this is the time not to call in a minister. This is where the doctor serves as a minister to his fellow-man. There are many questions that can be raised about this. Certainly when the rapport is so strong between the doctor and the patient, the doctor's word will carry much more weight and be much more helpful in this situation, at this particular moment than if he were to say "I can't do it, I must call in a clergyman because I don't want to get into his field."

The twelfth area has to do with the church's attitude toward psychiatry. This can take many hours of discussion. I would like to call your attention at this point to an excellent lecture on "Conflict and Cooperation Between Psychiatry and Religion", given by Dr. Finley Gale, Jr., past president of the American Psychiatric Association, and Professor and Chairman of Psychiatry, Medical College of Virginia. He has done, I think, an excellent job of clarifying the relationship between psychiatry and religion and making sure that we know that we ought now to begin to talk to each other. He says, "What I want to do now is to express my conviction that we are ready to move gradually from a status of peaceful co-existence to one of active cooperation and then I want to say something about the conditions under which I believe effective cooperation can helpfully take place." This was given to hundreds of psychiatrists and my belief is that this statement has helped to change the attitude of many who up until this time had never dared to associate with the minister because it might make them seem to be less scientific than they wanted to appear.

So to close this, let me say, religion and medicine are so intertwined that the medical student who graduates without having the opportunity to confront most or all of these issues under a qualified instructor will be at a serious disadvantage when in practice. In almost all of these areas listed he is considered to be some sort of an expert. If he is expected just to pick up this information in dormitory bull sessions, his information will probably not be very accurate. It is incongruous that his medical knowledge be so accurate and up-to-date, while his knowledge of religious matters, which is so closely involved in his practice of medicine often stamp him as being quite uninformed.

I was pretty thrilled to find that medical deans were willing to take this kind of criticism and yet I hope that it is more than criticism - an invitation to active cooperation. But it thrills me to know that they are no longer claiming that this is not important. They are now willing to say that this is important. With this in mind I think the next twenty-five years are going to be tremendous ones, and I hope that I will be permitted to stay around for another twenty-five years to see the unusual things which I think are going to be happening.

Thank you very much.

THE PERSONALITY IN NEUROSIS

A. L. Hoekstra

Today, I want to trace a few trends in psychiatric thinking. I do not intend to give a comprehensive outline of the neuroses nor of basic psychological theory. Nor would I approve of any hint that any of the ways of looking at neuroses which I talk about today should be considered as substitutes for other ways. The many and divergent schools of thought in psychiatry and psychology have given us highly useful viewpoints, but we are often tempted to think of the various schools of thought like the proverbial blind men inspecting an elephant. While it is sometimes true that one theorist may see only the trunk and another only the tail, for the most part, we do them an injustice in so viewing their contributions. The relationship of various schools of thought is more comparable to what happens if a group of jewelers focus their microscopes on the same gem, but look at it through different facets.

While dynamic theories of neurosis and the human personality are at least hinted at from antiquity, the most striking and systematic advance was that made by the acknowledged grandfather of all psychoanalysts, Sigmund Freud. His view of the human personality with and without neurosis was a kind of structural view by which such highly abstract concepts as id, ego and super-ego were compared to structures such as the atria and ventricles of the heart or the epidermal and dermal layers of the skin.

It was very natural and almost inevitable for Freud so to conceive of the human personality, because his work was done during a period when all of medicine was dominated by the structural point of view. All pathological processes were thought of pretty much in terms of what one would find in the dead body or in the surgical specimen after removal. Thus, while it was consistent with the trend of the late 19th century to think of a disease of the liver as a fixed structural abnormality seen grossly and microscopically by a pathologist at autopsy, it was also the trend of the times to think of the normal or neurotic personality as a structure with certain definite normal or abnormal relationships between its parts. It is not difficult to understand why Freud thought of the conscious and unconscious systems as fixed portions of human personality. The 20th century has brought about a rather subtle change in view. While a disease of an organ of the body is now thought of as something that the organ or rather various parts of the organ as well as other structures of the body are doing in an attempt to adapt to an injury, so in personality theory we tend now to conceive of a neurosis as being an act or acts on the part of human personality to adapt itself to injuries past and present. Thus, for example, we do not necessarily think of conscious and unconscious as being two very distinct layers of the human personality which are separated by a barrier that can be broken down only by analysis. In short, we no longer dip the human personality in formaldehyde to fix it and then come up with the fixed notion of its structure.

While I certainly do not mean to accuse Freud of completely neglecting the fluidity and adaptability of the human personality, the classical tradition in psychoanalysis has tended to hinder the development until the past few decades of a more dynamic view of personality. Only recently, there has come to the fore, even among many groups rather closely dominated by classical concepts, a view of neurosis which takes into account the actual day to day inter-relationships between neurotic people and certain neurotic or counter-neurotic people around them.

A striking result of the inter-personal view of neurosis is the finding that in many instances those functions of the human personality which were called by Freud the "ego" and "super-ego" are not completely present in each individual. For many people, certain mechanisms of defense such as reaction formation, are carried out not by the neurotic individual but by some other person in his environment. The most clear-cut examples of the incompleteness of the ego are to be seen in childhood where it is natural and normal for one or another or both parents to perform some of the child's ego functions for him. In classical psycho-analytical theory, we see the formation of the super-ego of the child by introjection of the super-ego of the parent. By maturity this process is considered to be complete and any neurosis which exists in the newly matured adult is thought of classically as being a faulty inter-relationship between the parts of the personality, such as the id, ego, and super-ego. However, in actuality, these ideals of maturity are rarely met and the super-ego is almost invariably incompletely formed and the ego is almost always in need of some person or concept or institution to play the role of the incompletely introjected parental super-ego. The ego too represses, suppresses, denies or projects very often in such perfect conformance to the identical mechanisms in a parent that we may consider these defenses in the child to be, at least in early stages, merely the filling in by the parent of an incompleteness in the child's ego. This condition often persists into adulthood.

A group of workers at the Mayo Clinic have been considering systematically the relationship between specific symptoms in neurotic children and the unconscious mental processes of the parents. In many cases, they have studied, they have found a one-to-one correspondence between a specific symptom such as soiling, bed-wetting, stealing, fire-setting or phobias, and the unconscious need in one or another of the parents to have these symptoms present. Thus, for example, we have not one fire-setter, but we have two. Both the parent and the child are fire-setters, but only one of the actors in this drama carries out the actual offense. However, the offense is committed for both of them. Thus far, it is possible to reconcile these findings with the classical view by considering the existence of a defect in the super-ego of the parent which then by introjection also becomes a defect in the super-ego of the child. However, I am led to consider this process as a drama in which a child is assigned a specific role as carrier of a symptom because of the fact that in a large number of cases where it is possible to cure one child in a family of his symptom, we find another and frequently only one other child in the family taking up the symptom. In short, it seems that in a large number of disturbed families, only one black sheep is required and is enough to satisfy the disturbed parent.

There is possibly a difference between the concept of incompleteness of the ego and the more classical concept of dependency. The classical concept of dependency is exemplified by the wish for someone else to do certain things for the person such as to make decisions, to initiate activities or such simple and obvious things as tie one's shoe.

The interaction between incomplete ego appears to penetrate to a deeper level than that of simple decision-making, actually involving the infrequently or never acknowledged (unconscious) mechanisms of defense. One form of this kind of interaction and perhaps the most brazen form is the syndrome of Folie-A-Deux. Of course, in this fascinating syndrome, the dominant partner performs a crucial ego-function for the weaker partner, and both people share openly the same system of delusions. In some less brazen forms of this kind of interpersonal disturbance, we may see the pathological process in the unconscious of one individual and in the behaviour and, indeed, often the conscious thinking of the other individual. Or, both partners-in-neurosis may be conscious of their disturbance (such as a phobia), but only one will carry out the (phobic avoidance) pattern.

An example of the incomplete adult is the mama's boy who has married. We frequently see such a man, sexually unaggressive and showing signs of a reluctance to take responsibility towards his home, frequently married to a woman who does not have the courage to stand squarely between him and his mother. On further inquiry, we find that mother is a frequent visitor in the home and acts more like his girl-friend than like his mother. They sit for minutes at a time holding hands or even necking on the parlor sofa like a pair of teenagers. While the classical view of this situation regards the mama's boy as having an unresolved oedipus complex, we can also look at it as a kind of mild and not very dramatic Folie-A-Deux. Mother wants to keep her son to herself and has been performing for this poor fellow those ego functions which have to do with the direction of his creative and sexual drives. Therefore, the man also believes, as does his mother, that he belongs to her. This belief may be quite unconscious or at least, in many instances, he would never be willing to admit it. However, everyone who is well acquainted with them knows very well which woman has succeeded in getting her man. Many people will observe also that mother does his thinking for him.

The relationship in which one person performs ego functions for another begins in the context of role. Thus, the incomplete child ego begins in the role of child. Where it persists into chronological adulthood, we see the incomplete ego still playing the role of child. This is certainly true of the mother dominated husband. It is also true of the man who assigns the parental role to his wife after he has carried out an incomplete rebellion from his mother.

There is tremendous and rich variety in role-playing among adults. The psychiatric patient may function in his marriage in the role of a child in relation to his mate who represents a parent, as sibling, or as a parent of either sex.

We often see curious mixtures of roles. The dominating person mixes the role of powerful parents with the unreasonable demandingness of infancy. We will find that this person, spoiled in childhood, is

unwilling to give up this aspect of the infantile role.

Role playing, in itself, is not necessarily a neurotic manifestation. We may see in it something that we may not happen to desire and term it neurotic as a form of scientific deprecation. Sigmund Freud did this in his discussions of the religious submission to God. Actually, in the playing of roles, we may find all manner of healthy and unhealthy constellations. We may find infantilism, stupidity, naivety, dominance, submissiveness, punitiveness and a host of other traits which are related to inter-personal affairs. However, when the role which a person is playing in his own mental processes does not fit the circumstances in which he is living or does not fit his own constitutional abilities and limitations, we often see the emergence of a neurosis, or at least a neurotic conflict. Neurosis itself, or even the question of who is neurotic, leads us again to a consideration of the fluidity of human personalities in action. Thus, we may take, as an example, the mama's boy who has married. His relationship to his mother in which he is playing an assigned role, is one which does not fit his circumstances. However, the fact that this discrepancy exists in his life does not necessarily mean that he will be the one to suffer from neurotic symptoms. It is possible for him to make his living circumstances fit his role by altering in his own mind his responsibilities towards his wife and home. If he succeeds in doing this, we may have a wife who is neurotic, or rather, I should say, shows neurotic symptoms. Sometimes it is the mother in this situation who shows the neurotic symptoms. While we are justified, I feel, in continuing to consider neurotic symptoms as belonging to the individual, we must look in the future for more instances in which the neurosis belongs not only to the individual but to the group. It is quite possible that social ills of a larger magnitude such as poverty and crime may also partake at least to some extent of this shared neurotic nature. I have at times toyed with the notion that we, as a society, are criminals and that we have delegated the performance of criminal acts such as burglary to a relatively small number of people. This idea is to some extent supported by the eager newspaper readership which has encouraged editors to put crime stories on the front page with two or three column headlines. Quite probably, there is adultery in the heart of every back-yard gossip who announces to the neighbors her computation of the number of months between a marriage and the appearance of the first baby.

It is the essential incompleteness of the human being and probably even the essential incompleteness of the most mature human being which calls for the assignment of roles to individuals or to institutions outside of the self. It is quite possible that the essentially religious nature of mankind is related to this incompleteness. The mature person seeks to give up the relationship with parents in which one or both parents perform the ego functions for him. Still incomplete, he must turn to something else to fill the void. Also, the notion of parental omnipotence has been dispelled. Hence, ideally, the void must be filled by some concept greater than that of man himself. In fact, certain people whom we may wish to consider good examples of emotionally maturity, namely the classical analysts, themselves have, in spite of every attempt to dispel religion, found for themselves a substitutive religion which, by the way, is philosophically rather far removed from the early scientific attitude of Sigmund Freud. In much of the literature on the history of the psychoanalytic movement excluding that by Freud himself, we see the frequent use of such religious terms as orthodoxy and defec-
tion.

NOTES ON THE DISCUSSION OF DR. HOEKSTRA'S PAPER

by Robt. F. De Haan

Dr. Broman:

In theology we talk about abanding yourself to God. If a person does this, is he making himself more a neurotic than a person who says, "I have some resources of my own."

Dr. Hoekstra:

A person who surrenders himself completely to God gets it back from Him. I think it is dishonest and neurotic to manufacture inability or kind of false humbleness about the abilities we have.

* * * * *

Dr. Tweedie:

Can a person perform the ego functions of another in the process of religious faith? For example, Paul writes to Timothy about his "unfeigned faith" which you receive from your mother and grandmother.

Dr. Hoekstra:

Faith is a gift of God and comes through the parents but it will not stick unless it comes from God.

(At this point some comments from the group followed which led to Dr. Hoekstra to add:)

Suppose a person is building a building and his teacher, the person who is showing him how to do it, is keeping very close supervision so that one might also say that the teacher moves the hand of the builder. He is being closely watched. The building is the work of the builder just as a child's faith is his own faith even though the parents do much to supervise him and give him ego strength. Yet as the builder gets gratification from the thing he builds, so a child, too, gets strength for his ego through his faith even though much of that is furnished by his parents.

Dr. Milkie:

I don't understand the orientation to Freud in this discussion. Are we trying to fit Scripture to Freudian analytic theory, or are we trying to fit Freud to the Scripture?

Dr. Hoekstra:

Freud's theory is simply a theory just as the electrons in modern physical theory are just a theory, that is no one has seen them. Theory exists for a purpose, to help us explain things, and that's what Freudian theory has done. Some scientists would like to be able to find a set of laws by which everything in nature can be explained. Bridgman does not want any closed theoretical system but rather that we should apply theory to only what we can see and feel. Science is systematized knowledge of nature.

Rev. Edward Heerema:

Our task is to integrate our Scriptural framework with the findings of Freud and others. By doing so we have a set of problems, but not necessarily a set of conflicts.

Dr. Milkie:

Freud is structural and speculative. How much must we depend on Freud? Freud is not a science but a set of speculative statements.

Dr. Hoekstra:

Newton was speculating in his day. His was simply a first approximation. Einstein came along with some more speculation and provided a second order of approximation to the truth. It may well be that we will need a third order. Science is fascinated with a search for truth. Religion is fascinated with truth. The two do not need to conflict.

Dr. Wendell Rooks: Every psychoanalyst needs a credo. The difference between the scientist and the scientistics should be noted, however. There are some things of Freud that we can work with.

Dr. Broman: Would you clarify for me what is meant by this incompleteness of personality? Must we accept a certain incompleteness and this does not stop as far as scientific inquiry, does it? Is incompleteness a neurotic condition? In Christian fellowship, incompleteness is desirable, I believe. This is true particularly in marriage where each one is incomplete without the other.

Dr. Hoekstra: The incompleteness of the ego is not necessarily neurotic. In fact, it is well nigh universal.

RESPONSIBILITY IN RELATION TO PERSONALITY.

by
Carl Kromminga

The two concepts in my subject can roughly be assigned to two classes of people who deal with men spiritually considered. "Responsibility" is the concept with which the minister of God's Word has much to do. "Personality" is a concept which preoccupies the psychiatric worker⁽¹⁾ and the psychologist. However, neither class of workers with the souls and minds of men can ignore either of these concepts. Psychiatric work is never a-moral. And the pastor does not work with responsibility in a vacuum. He is always having to do with the responsibility of men who have or exhibit "personality."

However, the concern of the minister for the preservation of the sense of responsibility, ultimately, responsibility to the sovereign God on the part of men, and the concern of the psychiatric worker for the health of personalities produce in each class of worker a conservative reflex. That is to say that the minister has a fear that recognition of the biblical truth of personal responsibility will be jeopardized by those who seek to explain the aberration from God's norms by a reference to personality disturbance. And the psychiatric worker tends to view with alarm the tendency on the part of the ministry to view all aberrations from divine norms without sufficient recognition of the sickness character of personality disturbance.

In order to enlarge the area of common understanding between the shepherd of souls and the psychiatric worker I propose first, to examine the concept of human responsibility, second, to examine the problems that attend the confrontation of men, particularly troubled church members, with their responsibilities; and third, to outline some of the implications of our findings for Christian ministers and Christian psychiatric workers.

I. Human Responsibility

It surely needs no demonstration that the Bible teaches that man must answer for his deeds to the infinitely holy and just creator and Sustainer of his being. The whole moral teaching of Scripture states and implies this responsibility. The truth of our responsibility will come to clearest light in that awful moment when we all stand before the judgment seat of God.

However, it will not be amiss, I take it, to outline some of the different senses in which responsibility is predicated of men in Holy

(1) Hereafter in this paper all psychologists, psychiatrists and allied workers will be concluded under the term "psychiatric worker." I hope the psychological theoreticians present will not be offended.

Scripture. Although our responsibility ultimately means that we must give answer to God and satisfy his justice, either by ourselves or by another, the Bible indicates that there are various aspects of human responsibility.

A. Racial Responsibility

1. Creational Responsibility

The primary responsibility set forth in Scripture is the responsibility which is at the same time a blessing and a privilege. In the answer to Question 6 of the Heidelberg Catechism we read, "Did God, then, create man so wicked and perverse?" The answer reads, "By no means; but God created man good, and after His own image; that is, in true righteousness and holiness, that he might rightly know God his Creator, heartily love Him, and live with Him in eternal blessedness to praise and glorify Him." This responsibility of knowledge, love and dominion to the praise of God is, in summary, his responsibility to be a prophet, priest, and king unto God in His creation. The fact of our post-lapsarian inability to fulfill this calling properly in no way diminishes the responsibility, the obligation, to do so.

2. Lapsarian Responsibility.

But here a second aspect of racial responsibility appears. The fall is the responsibility of all men. We are not, strictly speaking, the responsible agents of the fall. But, "In Adam's fall we sinned all." For Adam sinned in a representative capacity and his violation of the condition of the Covenant of Works is our violation in virtue of the Divine ordination with respect to the human race. Adam sinned and I am guilty. His guilt is immediately my guilt which means that all men are under obligation to render satisfaction to divine justice. And in the just judgment of God we are all born corrupt because of our guilt in Adam, because his guilt is reckoned to us.⁽²⁾ This guilt and corruption with their attendant responsibilities are the common heritage of all human beings and the question of mental ability or inability to shoulder these responsibilities consciously in no way affects the accountability of all men before God for the fall, nor their continuing obligation to fulfil the demands of the Covenant of Works.

3. Personal Responsibility.

For want of a better term we shall call the third

(2) Charles Hodge demonstrates that this is the teaching of Romans 5:12-21 in this masterful exposition of that passage, in Vol. II, pp. 202-203, of his Systematic Theology.

kind of racial or common responsibility "Personal Responsibility." This terminology must not be taken to imply that the person does not figure in lapsarian responsibility. We are personally obliged to suffer for Adam's sin which is our sin by Divine covenantal disposition. But we have in view here that unshared responsibility which we have for what theology calls "actual sin." And this kind of sin, proceeding from our guilty and corrupt nature, is not necessarily voluntarily nor consciously committed. Here again, the question of recognition or non-recognition of the sin committed in no way affects the truth of responsibility.

4. Evangelical Responsibility.

There is a fourth kind of responsibility which is racial in the sense that all men who hear the gospel of Christ bear it. It may be called evangelical responsibility. Paul points to this responsibility in his Athenian address-- Acts 17:30, "The times of ignorance therefore God overlooked; but now he commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent." Ability and/or inability, again, do not alter the fact of responsibility since this, as well as all responsibility, is imposed by the absolute Lord of all.

B. Christian Responsibility.

The second major area of responsibility is not common to all men but exists only for all true Christians.

That those who profess the Christian faith in truth bear great responsibilities in the context of the new life needs no demonstration. A detailed analysis of the responsibilities in the new life would require volumes. Perhaps a few aspects of Christian responsibility can be indicated.

1. First, the Christian is under solemn obligation to continue in the faith unto sanctification. He is obliged to conform his life in faith to the Christ who bought him. The fact that the Holy Spirit alone can cause him to meet this obligation does not lessen its force at all. In fact, the truth that "it is God who worketh in you" is the specific reason for working out our own salvation in fear and trembling, Phil. 2:12-13.
2. Second, and this follows inevitably from the first observation, the Christian must keep the law of God; that is, he must love God with a total commitment and he must love his neighbor as himself. This not only involves the observance of the moral law, as we commonly view it. It also involves the joyful effort to bring all of life into harmony with the basic creation ordinances. That is to say that the Christian constantly seeks to observe the moral law of God in its basic harmony with the ordinances of creation. Not to commit adultery in

the Old Testament era did not mean to refrain from having more than one wife. But Christian obedience is obedience to the moral law in its fullest and deepest significance, Cf. Matt. 5:17-32; Mark 10:7,8. (3)

3. The Christian is obliged to reflect the perfection of the Father's love for him in Jesus Christ. He is to walk by the Spirit, to show the fruits of the Spirit, to be perfect in his love to his enemies, and to be conformed to the image of God's Son. Here, again, God's gracious activity does not relieve the Christian of responsibility--compare Romans 8:28-29 with Ephesians 4:15.

No doubt the list and ramifications of the Christian's duties and responsibilities can be multiplied, much could be added concerning the Christian's familial, occupational and ecclesiastical responsibilities. Enough has been said, I trust, to show that, while the mass of responsibility which the Christian shares with all men no longer bears a dark and threatening character, for Christ has redeemed us from the whole curse of the whole law, the Christian, nevertheless, is under obligation to God totally in the life of Christian gratitude.

II. Confrontation.

We have seen repeatedly that the fact of one's responsibility is not, in the Biblical description of our situation, contingent upon the capacity to shoulder responsibility. This is most graphically seen in the Biblical doctrine of original sin, but the same principle is valid for all of our responsibilities. Even our Christian responsibilities are not binding only in proportion to the grace presently received. That we have only a small beginning of true obedience does not lessen our obligation to be as holy as God is. This indicates that our meager success in the life of faith must be productive of a longing for the age to come.

However, it is precisely here that the problem of confrontation with responsibility becomes acute. Christians--and I propose to have them in view exclusively from this point on--do not always walk by faith and in hope and love. The presence of the active old man in the flesh causes us not only to fall short of the requirements of God but often to live in disobedience to them. And this necessarily means that the personality of the Christian is continually in some kind of disturbance. But his "I thank God through Jesus Christ my Lord" is also part of his personality order and

- (3) These passages refer, of course, to divorce and not to polygamy. But the citation of "the beginning" is instructive for our purpose here.

and supplies the Christian with the power to turn from his disobedience and to affirm the ultimate eradication of it. But the facing of disobedience and the meaningful reception of admonition to turn from it in confession of sin and faith in Christ presuppose (4) that the personality is able to function. And here we come to an area of concern of which the Christian psychiatric worker is keenly aware. It is precisely this presupposition which he feels the minister tends to neglect to investigate. Admonition and discipline and other reminders of responsibility are sometimes administered with apparently little investigation of the subject's functional ability to receive them meaningfully. The question is not whether a person with feelings of guilt is responsible to God. He may not really be guilty of the sin which obsesses him, but his context of responsibility remains. We are concerned here, however, with his ability to face his responsibilities and assume them.

But this confronts us with the necessity of making another distinction in the concept of responsibility. At the risk of making an invalid distinction, allow me to discriminate between responsibility of action and responsibility of motive. The fetishistic kleptomaniac who is under compulsion to take what is not his bears a responsibility of action. That is he can be identified as the person who took what was not his and is obliged to make restitution before law. But his motive is not economic but accumulative and unrelated to the acquisition of wealth. It may even be questioned whether the stealing is motivated at all in the ordinary sense of the term. It is compulsive. The personality of the fetishistic kleptomaniac cannot exercise choice in this matter and choice is involved in usual motivation. The severe kleptomaniac can be identified as the "stealer" but he cannot be called a thief in the ordinary sense of the term. Thus he is not responsible for taking what is not his in order to better his economic position. He is not to be identified as one who wishes to violate the providential disposition of goods. To lecture him on the sanctity of the divine disposition of property is meaningless. And if it be objected that he is responsible for the state of affairs in which kleptomania and other anti-social compulsions are realities, consider that we are all responsible for this common woe. And even the attempt to confront the sufferer with his participation in responsibility for common woe will not be significant. He is not functionally capable either of recognizing or denying his involvement. This does not diminish the formal responsibility of the man, to be sure, for infants are also responsible for this, but it does render the attempt at confrontation useless.

But in this matter there is general agreement. We face a different situation when we deal with people who suffer from anxiety neuroses which do not always root in a psychopathic condition. Is the alcoholic responsible? (5) The question is complicated by the fact that the ultimate disorder which drives him to drink is

- (4) They also presuppose the working of God's Spirit, but these two presuppositions do not oppose but rather compliment each other according to God's manner of working, Cf. Canons of Dordt, III-IV, Article 17.
- (5) I appreciate the fine discussion of this problem by the Rev. Allan Dykstra in the January 1957 issue of the Christian Sanitorium Quarterly, pp. 10-12.

accompanied by a recognized appetitive factor. And often people who use drink as a crutch feel guilty about having succumbed again to the temptation to drown their troubles. Nevertheless, there is with the sense of guilt and remorse an accompanying desperate feeling of helplessness. It appears that a certain social self-help and mutual-help combination can make the alcoholic dry - - this is the method of Alcoholics Anonymous. But this method cannot even begin to be employed unless the alcoholic expresses a desire to be helped. It appears that at a certain stage in the process of enslavement there is a point of no return. Will power is ineffective. Moralism plus trust in a higher power are inadequate. Or, to stick to terms which are more distinctively Christian, exhortation to break with sin and to rely upon the Lord do not guarantee success in the struggle with temptation. At this point a more radical cure is indicated. "Do-it-yourself-with-God's-help" does not touch the problem because this problem cannot be avoided by re-channeling effort, nor by veneering it with wilfull exertion. Not only cure but also effective reckoning with responsibility and confession of sin require a meaningful confrontation with the basic problems which lead to the narcotic use of alcohol. It is most important that efforts in therapy and confrontation begin early so that the alcoholic can be brought face to face with his problem of creating conflicts and responsibilities and directed to ways to solve his problems in faith. If deterioration has progressed too far, he cannot be brought back to the roots of his responsibility and guilt.

III. Implications.

Although I am keenly aware of the fact that I have not unravelled the maze of moral problems which are involved in personality disturbances, I feel that we can move on to list some implications of the thoughts developed above. I shall begin with those which are rather obvious and proceed to those which are more debatable.

1. Every minister should be trained to discern psychopathic symptoms and should be armed with techniques for getting the sufferer under competent psychiatric care. There is surely no debate concerning the desirability of this training.
2. We should recognize that whenever a conscience which has turned to the will of God and other norms passes judgment on acts or thoughts which conflict with the standard used, the personality balance of the subject is disturbed by the discerned conflict between desire and norm.

It is here that we are confronted with the greatest problems. In dealing with people who come to us with an acknowledgment of guilt and in dealing with people who are not conforming conduct to the will of God certain facts should be ascertained before either admonition or therapy proper is administered.

- a. The counsellor should seek to discern whether the conscience of the disturbed person is educated by the Word of God or by some human perversion of or addition to that truth. Interviewing often uncovers the fact that

the conscience of the person in trouble is passing judgment on conduct not on the basis of the authoritative Word of God but rather on the basis of some tradition or old wives' tale. Perfectionism, misdirected emphasis on success or achievement, mother's ideas about men, accepted norms from one's childhood recollections, the Dutch fetish of cleanliness and a host of other human standards are confused with the standards of God's Word. Clan and tribe lay upon the shoulders of many burdens heavy and grievous to be born. Phariseeism is not dead among us. The remedy lies in the reeducation of the conscience, but this presupposes thorough knowledge of the will of God on the part of the counsellor and tact and patience in disposing of the old, unbiblical prejudice. Ambivalence involves mighty forces and triggering these into reaction will multiply conflicts rather than eliminate them.

- b. In seeking to fix responsibility the pastor or counsellor must take full account of involvement in guilt of others in the subject's social environment. This is especially important in dealing with rebellious young people. The Word of God gives clear guidance here. Paul admonishes children to obey their parents, but he hastens to add, "Fathers, provoke not your children, that they be not discouraged." Col. 3:21.
- c. When a minister detects that beneath the acknowledged conflict lie other unconscious conflicts he should seek to call in competent help for the purpose of laying bare this conflict. The closest collaboration between the minister and the professional psychiatric worker should be maintained so that the moral issues which are unearthed may be dealt with at the proper time and in the proper manner.

Common commitment to the Word of God on the part of the psychiatric worker and the pastor is highly desirable and, perhaps, even absolutely necessary.

3. The authority and dignity with which the counsellor carries the responsibilities of his office or calling should be accompanied by a manifest sympathy for, love for, and understanding of those in the throes of conscience conflict. Solidarity with the person in trouble in terms of common depravity and need of grace should be felt if not verbally communicated. There is no substitute for genuine concern.

4. We do well to reckon seriously the power of confession in personal prayer in dealing with those who are made aware of the real nature of their guilt. If the counsellor inspires confidence in the person seeking help he can be instrumental in bringing the Christian seeker to do what he in all probability has not been able to do for a long time---articulate his feelings and anxiety in prayer to God. The therapy of this transference of problems to God is clearly indicated in Phil. 4:6-7.

5. This leads me to a final thought which is difficult to delimit because it is based on an impression and not on statistical research. I have an impression, gleaned from brief years of observation, that the Christian groups represented here have been heavy on sin and light on grace. In saying this I do not mean to deny that the theology of the way of salvation through faith in the vicarious death of our Lord has been neglected in the pulpit. To the contrary, it has doubtless been proclaimed forcefully particularly in order to oppose the pagan liberalism of our day. But polemics is always taxing and must not stand alone. It appears that for all our struggling to keep true formulations of the truth, we have let slip the dynamic of the events of redemptive history. Something marvelous and powerful for the here and now happened when the Lord Jesus died and rose again the third day. We have chanted the "Credo," but it seems not to have much affected life.

I do not wish to convey the idea that I see no dangers in emphasizing the triumph of our Lord over the totality of those black powers that were God's just threat to us because of our depravity and sin. I realize full well that there are abnormal people who can do irresponsible things when they use the triumph of Christ as they might use any psychic stimulant. But there is something dreadfully wrong when Romans 8 becomes dear to the heart only in periods of sickness, trial or mourning. The free gifts of God in Jesus Christ are for every day and self-sacrificing living under the impact of the free, sovereign grace of God can, with the Holy Spirit's blessing, be real and powerful in the life of the community of those who confess the Reformed faith.

And here our thoughts on responsibility and personality turn back upon us. In trying to reckon responsibly with the problem of responsibility for guilt in those people under our care who suffer from personality disturbances we must joyfully assume our responsibility to love them to the praise of God by serving them sacrificially for Christ's sake. "If I speak with the tongues of men and angels, but have not love, I am become sounding brass, or a clanging cymbal." The care of souls and the cure of minds is not a task for self-promoting cymbals but for consecrated representatives of the love of God in Christ Jesus.

NOTES ON DISCUSSION OF PROF. KROMMINGA'S PAPER.

by R. F. De Haan

Dr. Hoekstra:

What is the essential nature of sin? Is it an offense or act against a catalogue of sins? This seems to be the western tradition. The Greek, or eastern tradition, however, does not state it as a catalogue of sins but rather a state or relationship toward God.

Rev. Kromminga:

In our culture we do emphasize the activistic aspect of sin and our civil government needs to catalogue sin. This is the legal context of the west. The Lutherans, in particular, emphasize that acts of sin are rooted in the perversion of our nature. We are not sinful because we sin, but we sin because we are sinful. The counterpart of that is that you do good because you are good in Christ. The Greek mysticism has something to command it. We have been strongly influenced by Rome and the Roman legal mind is strongly imprinted on us. The legal relationship is not sufficient. We need to have a dynamic relationship in Christ.

Dr. Hoekstra: There are examples of impulse neurosis when there is a sense of doing wrong. That is, a person knows that he is doing right or wrong.

Dr. Rooks:

I know a person whose tension builds up and continues to build up till finally he has to steal something even if it is a piece of bubble gum. If we stand under an apple tree and apples fall on us we can safely assume that it is an apple tree, nevertheless it might be a pear tree with an apple branch grafted on it. Therefore, things that are seemingly sins are not necessarily sins.

Rev. Kromminga:

The law says in such a case you had to make restitution. I would like to know, however, whether the conscience of the person is being affected. The minister says confess your sins to the Lord, but it's more than that. What is the root of sin? This is the question we must ask. If it lies in a sickness then that sickness has to be dealt with, and then the sense of guilt can be alleviated.

Dr. Rooks:

A sense of guilt can be a sin, it can be idolatrous.

Rev. Kromminga:

If a person is "cured" does he have to go back and confess all the sins that he committed during his mental illness? Is it not that Christ died for our sin and that we do not have to be concerned about the catalogues of sins? Should he confess every single one of his unconfessed sins?

Dr. Van Noord:

In the case of which an act is a violation of the law, we as psychiatrist have to decide if it was a sin or sickness. In the example of compulsive stealing, for example, a judge sends the person to me and I have to decide whether it was sin or sickness. The judge says the law was broken. He is a guilty man. The psychiatrist has to determine if the man knew right from wrong when he did his act, and has to decide if he is a sick man. It is a real question for judges whether they should accept psychiatric opinion.

Take the consistory of a church, for example. Should such a compulsive robber have to confess his sin of stealing or not?

Rev. Kromminga:

The consistory should not insist upon a confession until a person is healed, if he can be healed, and even then a person should not have to go back and confess every sin that he committed while he was sick. A person while he is not under the compulsion to steal will readily agree with you that it is a sin to steal, but when the compulsion is operating on him there is nothing that he can do to control it.

Rev. Monsma:

Where do we draw the line between the compulsive sin of the kleptomaniac and the sin of the ordinary sinner? Isn't a man a bound servant of sin and doesn't everyone sin compulsively?

This question was not adequately answered and remained so when time was called.

PROGRAM OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION
at the
Western Theological Seminary
on
March 27-28, 1957.

Wednesday, March 27

- 9:00 A.M. - Registration - Coffee
- 9:45 A.M. - Join with Seminary Faculty and students in worship.
 Remarks by President Mulder of the Seminary.
 Devotional message by Prof. C. Kromminga.
- 10:15 A.M. - Opening remarks and introduction of the Speaker by
 G. A. Van Noord, M.D., President.
- 10:20 A.M. - John T. Daling, Ph. D.
 "Toward a Christian Concept of Personality."
- 11:00 A.M. - Brief presentation by discussants.
 Rev. E. Alan Richardson
 M. J. Beukema, M.D.
 G. R. Youngs, M.A.
 Cornelia Bratt, A.B., M.S.W.
- 12:15 P.M. to 1:30 P.M. - Robert F. De Haan, Ph.D., Vice-President, presiding.
 Convention divides for group discussion.
 Psychiatrist, J. D. Plekker, M.D., Presiding.
 Psychologists, L. C. Vander Linde, Ph.D., presiding.
 Educators, J. A. Van Bruggen, Ph.D., presiding.
 Psychiatric-Social workers and Psychiatric nurses -
 H. J. Nyenhuis, M.A., presiding
 Pastors, Rev. C. Van Heukelom, presiding
- 2:45 P.M. - General meeting -
 Group reports.
 General discussion.
 Reflections and observations by Dr. Daling.
- 6:30 P.M. - Banquet.
 Group singing led by Riemer Van Til.
 Vocal solo - Harley Brown
- 8:00 P.M. - General meeting
 Granger Westberg, Ph.D.
 "Religion and Medical Education."

Thursday, March 28

- 9:30 A.M. - Rev. E. Heerema, presiding.
 Devotional message - Rev. H. Bast
 A. L. Hoekstra, M. D.
 "The Personality in Neurosis."
 Discussion.
- 10:45 A.M. - Business session.
- 12:00 A.M. to 1:30 A.M. - Luncheon.
- 1:30 A.M. - W. Vander Lugt, Ph.D., presiding
 C. Kromminga, Th.B.
 "Responsibility in Relation to Personality."

WHO'S WHO AMONG PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS.

M. J. Beukema, M. D.
Psychiatrist, Pine Rest Christian Association.

Cornelia Bratt, A.B., M.S.W.
Social Worker, Pine Rest Christian Association

J. T. Daling, Ph.D.
Professor of Psychology, Calvin College

A. L. Hoekstra,
Psychiatrist, Grand Rapids, Michigan.

C. Kromminga, Th. B.
Instructor in Practical Theology, Calvin Seminary

H. J. Nyenhuis, M. A.
Bethany Christian Home Director

J. D. Plekker, M.D.
Psychiatrist, Pine Rest Christian Association

E. Alan Richardson, Th.M.
Pastor, Garfield Boulevard United Presbyterian Church,
Chicago, Illinois.

J. A. Van Bruggen, Ph.D.
Professor of Education, Calvin College

J. C. Vander Linde, Ph.D.
Psychologists, Grand Rapids, Michigan.

C. Van Heukelom, Th. B.
Hospital Pastor, Bethesda Sanatorium, Denver, Colorado.

G. Westberg, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Religion and Health, Chicago Univ.

G. R. Youngs, M.A.
Principal, Timothy Christian High School, Cicero, Ill.

IN MEMORY OF

John G. Kingma, M.D.

who was among the first participants in the conferences on psychology and psychiatry, that led to the organization of this Association. He served on the Board of Directors from the first, and was the president of the organization from 1955 to 1956.

CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

Minutes of the Business Session

Thursday, March 28, 1957.

1. The president of the association, Dr. G. A. Van Noord, opened the business session at 11:00 A.M. following the morning program.
2. The secretary read the minutes of the 1956 conference as they appear in the Proceedings. The minutes were approved as recorded.
3. The secretary made the following report for the past year:

"The newly elected Board of Governors functioning under the tentatively adopted constitution went into session together with the retiring officers of the 1956 Conference on Thursday, April 5, 1956. This was an organization meeting. The following officers were chosen for 1956-1957:

President, Dr. G. A. Van Noord; Vice-President, Dr. R. F. De Haan; Executive Secretary, Dr. C. Jaarsma; Corresponding Secretary, Miss Cornelia Bratt; Treasurer, Rev. E. A. Richardson. The following were chosen as executive committee; Miss C. Bratt, Rev. E. Heerema, Dr. C. Jaarsma, Prof. C. Kromminga, Dr. G. Van Noord.

The executive committee met on Friday, June 29, 1956 to prepare an agenda for the meeting of the Board of Governors which was scheduled for October 19, 1956. The Board of Governors has held three meetings: October 19, November 30, 1956 and March 26, 1957. At these meetings the work of the new organization was carried forward. The present convention was planned at these meetings and proposals for the business session of the organization were formulated.

Proceedings of the 1956 Conference were compiled as soon after the close of the Conference as possible and sent out to those who requested them. Copies of the Proceedings on hand have been placed on sale at this Convention.

Your secretary is happy to report that interest in this Association is growing, judging from the response that has been received. Publicity of the work accomplished has been carried out through articles and advertisements. Thorough planning is of the essence in effective organization. It is also essential that the execution of the work be centralized as much as possible. All this should be borne in mind as the administrative work for the association is set up.

The program of the convention is carrying forward the work begun at earlier conferences. We should keep working toward the building up of a body of literature that can help us all, and those that follow us, to clarify our thinking in the areas of Christian service touched by a better understanding of the person in his psychic structure and functioning. This we desire to do in the light of what God tells us about man in His Holy Word.

Submitted by,

Cornelius Jaarsma
Executive Secretary.

Minutes of the Business Session (continued)

4. The treasurer reported as follows:

March 26, 1957

Disbursements:

Ethel De Leeuw for secretarial work and trans- cribing record- ings for proceed- ings of 1956	\$31.25
Electronic Sound Co.	20.00
Travel expense, Bd. of Governors (2 mtg)	59.00
Ethel De Leeuw for secretarial work in preparing 1956 Proceedings	67.20
Calvin College Printing 1956 Pro- ceedings	108.70
Transportation for Dr. G. Westberg	19.17
	<u>\$305.32</u>

Receipts:

Cash on hand after 1956 Conference	\$ 170.82
Deposits from sale of Proceedings	<u>173.25</u>
	\$ 344.07
Disbursements	<u>305.32</u>
Balance (March 26)	\$ 38.75

Outstanding bills:

The Banner - for advertising	8.80
Calvin College - postage and letters	<u>31.54</u>
	\$40.34

Submitted by
E. Alan Richardson,
Treasurer.

5. The secretary was instructed to convey the thanks of the association to the Western Theological Seminary, Dr. J. R. Mulder, President, and to his secretary, Mrs. Dobbens for their kindness as hosts to this convention.
6. The president reported that an anonymous donor has offered to underwrite the expense of the convention to the extent of the coffee breaks, programs printed, and an additional donation of one hundred dollars. The Association instructed the president to extend their thanks to the donor.
7. In the absence of the executive secretary, the work of this office was discussed. The sentiment was expressed that if the work of the

Association is to have continuity, this office should be made a more permanent one than is possible under the present set up. No further action was taken on this point. The motion was passed, however, to recommend to the Board of Directors that if Dr. Jaarsma is reelected he be continued in his present office.

8. The Association voted an honorarium of two hundred dollars to be paid to the executive secretary for the extensive work accomplished for the association during the past two years. The secretary expressed his thanks to the association, when this was announced to him upon his return to the meeting.

9. The following constitution was adopted by the association:

Article I - Name

The official name of the organization herein set forth is Christian Association for Psychological Studies.

Article II - Basis

The Association shall be based on the Bible as interpreted in the historic Reformed Creeds.

Article III - Purpose

The Association aims to advance the Christian understanding of psychology and related areas in conformity with the above basis. In order to realize this aim the Association shall:

1. Develop this understanding through study and research.
2. Assemble annually in convention for presentation of papers, discussion, and carrying on the official business of the association.
3. Publish proceedings of the conventions and such additional studies as approved from time to time by the Board of Directors.
4. Serve the needs and interests of professional groups concerned with inter-personal relations.

Article IV - Membership.

1. Men and women who are interested professionally in various fields related to psychology shall be eligible for membership.
2. Membership requires the acceptance of the Bible as the divine authority for faith and life.
3. Membership entails the payment of an annual membership fee to be determined by the association.

Article V - Board of Directors

1. A Board of Directors consisting of nine members shall be elected by the Association. At least four of the nine in close geographic proximity shall function as an executive committee to carry out the policies as determined

by the Board of Directors.

2. The term of office of directors shall be three years with the terms of three directors expiring each year. A director may serve two consecutive terms.
3. The Board of Directors shall elect from their own number a president, a vice-president, an executive secretary, a corresponding secretary, and a treasurer.
4. The Board of Directors shall meet at least twice a year to carry on the business of the association.
5. The Board of Directors shall nominate candidates for office of director prior to the annual election.
6. Candidates for office of director shall be limited to those members who fully subscribe to the basis as stated in article II.

Article VI - Meetings

1. The Association shall hold an annual convention, the time and place to be determined by the Board of Directors.
2. A business session shall be held in connection with the annual convention.

Article VII - Finances.

1. Sources of revenue shall be annual membership dues, sale of publications, and such further sources as shall be determined by the Association.
2. The Board of Directors shall prepare an annual report and budget and submit these to the Association at the annual business meeting.
3. The Board of Directors is responsible for administering the finances of the Association.

Article VIII - Amendments.

1. Article II of this constitution may not be amended or modified.
2. Other articles of this constitution may be changed or amended, by two-thirds vote of the membership in annual convention.
3. Proposed amendments should be in the hands of the executive secretary six months prior to the annual convention.

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9. The following ballot was presented to the Board of Directors:
Education-Academic (2 to be selected)
J. Daling, *C. Jaarsma, *C. Kromminga, C. Plantinga

Pastoral (2 to be selected)

***E. Heerema, Wm. L. Hiemstra, *E. A. Richardson,
and C. Van Heukelom**

Psychiatric-Institutional (2 to be selected)

M. J. Beukema, *K. V. Kuiper, J. D. Plekker, *G.A. Van Noord

Psychological-Clinical (1 to be selected)

*** R. F. De Haan, L. C. Vander Linde**

Psychiatric-Community (1 to be selected)

A. L. Hoekstra, * J. G. Kingma

Social Workers - Nurses (1 to be selected)

***C. Bratt, H. Nyenhuis**

(* indicates present officers of Association)

The following nominations were made from the floor:

Pastoral: Rev. T. Van Eerden

Psychiatric-Institutional: Dr. R. Rozendal

Psychological-Clinical: Mr. J. Split

Psychiatric-Community: Dr. W. Rooks.

10. The following proposal by the Board of Directors was adopted: The tenure of office for each candidate elected be determined on the basis of the number of votes received, the highest three to serve for three years, the next three highest for two years, and the following three in order of votes received to serve for one year.

11. The balloting brought the following results:

41 votes were cast:

Bratt	31	Jaarsma	31
De Haan	28	Kromminga	29
Heerema	18	Kuiper	20
Hoekstra	22	Richardson	31
		Van Noord	31

Elected for three years:

C. Bratt E. A. Richardson

C. Jaarsma G. A. Van Noord

**(Since the constitution provides for three directors
to retire every year, one must serve for two years.)**

Elected for two years:

R. De Haan

C. Kromminga

Elected for one year:

E. Heerema, A. L. Hoekstra

K. V. Kuiper.

12. The chairman appointed Mr. A. J. Broman, Dean of Men at the Moody Bible Institute, and the executive secretary to serve as membership committee. Another appointee will be added later.
13. The Association set \$5.00 as an annual membership fee for the coming year.
14. The president reported an invitation of the Calvin Seminary, through Dr. J. H. Kromminga, to hold the 1958 Convention there. The invitation was accepted with thanks.
15. The business session adjourned to continue the program for the afternoon.

STANDING COMMITTEES

Long-Range Project Committee

C. Kromminga, Chairman

J. Daling

K. Kuiper

Finance Committee

G. Van Noord, Chairman

C. Bratt

T. Jansma

Membership Committee

C. Jaarsma, Chairman

A. Broman

E. Clowney

D. Tweedy

L. Vermeer

Organization Committee

R. De Haan, Chairman

E. Heerema

M. De Vroome

